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JO DESHA LUCAS
FLOOD TIDE: SOME IRRELEVANT
HISTORY OF THE ADMIRALTY
The shore has a dual nature, changing 'with
the swing of the tides, belonging now to the
land, now to the sea. On the ebb tide it knows
the harsh extremes of the land world, being ex-
posed to beat and cold, to wind, to rain and dry-
ing sun. On the flood tide it is a water world,
returning briefly to the relative stability of the
open sea.
RACHEL CARSON
The staple of maritime personal injury cases before the Supreme
Court in recent years involves an injury to a longshoreman, his
proceeding to recover from the shipowner under the Sieracki doc-
trine,' and the shipowner's third-party claim against the stevedore's
employer for indemnity under the Ryan doctrine.2 Three of these
Jo Desha Lucas is Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
' Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracld, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). In Sieracki, the Court extended
to longshoremen "doing seamen's work" the warranty of seaworthiness applied
in favor of seamen in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); see also
Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
2 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). In Ryan,
the Court held that when the unseaworthiness that grounded the claim against
the shipowner was produced by the negligence of the stevedore, the stevedore was
liable to the shipowner for the amounts he was required to lay out. The liability
was predicated upon an implied warranty of workmanlike service in the contract
between the parties. See also Weyerhauser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co.,
355 U.S. 563 (1958); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1954).
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cases during the last two terms represent continued extensions of
previous doctrines. These are but the latest chapters of a painfully
long story.
I. THE CASE OF THE UNSEAWORTHY BEAN BAG
In Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,3 the libelant
was a longshoreman employed in unloading a cargo of beans. The
beans had been shipped in bags, some of which apparently were
defective. There was no evidence that the shipowner knew that the
bags were defective. The contract stevedore sent coopers on board
to sew up some of the bags, but a number of others broke in the
course of unloading, some on the ship and some on the pier. The
libelant was working on the pier when he slipped on loose beans,
fell, and sustained the injuries complained of. He brought his libel
in two counts, one in negligence under the general maritime law,
and one grounded on unseaworthiness. He had a decree in the
district court4 and the shipowner appealed. The court of appeals
reversed with instructions5 and the libelant appealed.
The unseaworthiness count presented the Supreme Court for
the first time with the question whether the shipowner's absolute
warranty of seaworthiness extends to a longshoreman working on
the pier. This question had been answered in the affirmative in a
number of lower court cases in which objects had fallen from the
ship and injured shoreside longshoremen. 6 In Gutierrez the Court
approved the result of these cases, agreeing with Judge Learned
Hand in Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic7 that breach of the
warranty of seaworthiness of the ship and its tackle is a tort arising
out of maritime status and relationship and is therefore a maritime
tort whether committed on sea or on land. It remained to establish
that in Gutierrez the ship or its tackle was unseaworthy.
While all the cases that had allowed recovery for injuries sus-
tained on shore had involved some failure of the equipment of the
3 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
4 Gutierrez v. The S.S. Hastings, 193 F. Supp. 894 (D. Puerto Rico 1961).
5 301 F. 2d 415 (1st Cir. 1962).
6 See, e.g., Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F. 2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950).
7Ibid.
[1964
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ship,8 or an accident that had occurred on the ship but caused injury
on the pier, in Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines9
the Court had held indirectly that recovery for a shipboard injury
could be predicated upon the defective condition of steel bands
used to contain a cargo of burlap, and in Reddick v. McAllister
Lighterage Line ° the Second Circuit had held that the shipowner
was liable for injury to a longshoreman when, because of a latent
defect, a packing case broke when he stood on it."
In Gutierrez, the Court read these cases as holding that the doc-
trine of seaworthiness "is in essence that things about a ship, whether
the hull, the decks, the machinery, the tools furnished, the stowage,
or the cargo containers, must be fit for the purpose for which they
are to be used."'12 So cargo containers became gear pro hac vice,
and without even a finding that the Rhodians carried off grain in
earthen jars provided by the ship. Having characterized the bean
bags as ship's gear, the Court had no trouble in holding them un-
seaworthy. As everyone knows, wrote Mr. Justice White, beans
belong in their bags and a bean bag that fails to contain its beans
and permits them to roll ad libitum on the pier is unfit and hence
unseaworthy.
The opinion in the Gutierrez case leaves a great many unan-
swered questions. The first two "things about a ship," its hull and
decks, cause no trouble, for they are always part of the ship itself.
The stowage is either the hold where cargo is stored, in which event
it, too, is part of the ship, or not properly a "thing" at all, but a
8 Ibid.; Hagans v. Farrell Lines, 237 F. 2d 477 (3d Cir. 1956); see also Alaska Pacific
SS. Co. v. Egan, 202 F. 867 (9th Cit. 1913), an action at law permitting recovery
for failure of ship's equipment on shore; Robillard v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 186
F. Supp. 193 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
0 369 U.S. 355 (1962).
10 258 F. 2d 297 (2d Cir. 1958).
11But see Carabellese v. Naviera Aznar, S.A, 285 F. 2d 355 (2d Cir. 1960), where
Judge Friendly ruled that it was not error to instruct the jury that unseaworthiness
could not be predicated upon the top-heaviness of a crate of cargo. Despite the
instruction, the jury had answered in the negative a special interrogatory on the
top-heaviness of the crate, and Judge Friendly and Judge Tuttle held this to be an
alternative ground for affirming a verdict for the defendant; Chief Judge Lumbard
reserved judgment. The court was unanimous, however, in its approval of the
instruction.
12 373 U.S. at 213.
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condition, the manner of storing. Since the Court was explicit in
its statement that the ship warrants that the cargo is properly
stowed, and cited with approval the Robillard case 13 holding a ship-
owner liable for injuries produced on shore through unseaworthy
stowage, that term can no longer give trouble. Cargo containers are
generally furnished by the ship insofar as the longshoreman is con-
cerned, and the holding of the case is to the effect that their defec-
tive condition will ground an action for unseaworthiness whether
the defect shows itself on sea or on land.
Machinery is sometimes ship's machinery and sometimes fur-
nished by the contract stevedore. In Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson,'14
it was held that the failure of equipment assumed to have been
brought on the ship by the longshoreman's employer constituted
unseaworthiness. Since the decision in Gutierrez, the Second Cir-
cuit, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, has held that the shipowner
does not warrant the "seaworthiness" of shore equipment being
readied for contact with the ship. Conceding that once the equip-
ment became affixed to the ship it may well be that a seaman or
longshoreman engaged in unloading could recover on the ground
of unseaworthiness if he were injured as a result of its not being fit
for its intended use, Judge Friendly suggested that "... a warranty
normally relates to what has been furnished by the warrantor, not
by someone else whose equipment is merely being readied for the
warrantor's use." 15 Even this modest limitation upon the sweep of
the Sieracki doctrine was made over a dissent. Judge J. Joseph Smith
was of the opinion that in affixing the equipment to the ship, the
longshoreman was doing a "seaman's work" within the Sieracki
doctrine. He cited The Osceola,16 where the injury occurred while
the seaman was engaged in preparing a cargo gangway on the ship
for use when the vessel should tie up at the pier. Because the major-
ity found that the equipment was not, as yet at least, appurtenant
to the ship, Judge Friendly did not have to deal with the problem
of status as a seaman. He did observe that whatever seamen's his-
torical duties in readying ship's gangways, "it takes some imagina-
13 Robillard v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 186 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
14 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
15 Forkin v. Furness Withy & Co., Ltd., 323 F. 2d 638, 641 (2d Cir. 1963).
16 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
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don to suppose that the work of putting out a gangplank from shore
"117to ship was generally done by members of the ship's crew....
Gangways, gangplanks, and equipment of this sort are made
appurtenant to the ship in a physical sense. Since the equipment had
not been so attached at the time of the accident, it could be said
that no duty had arisen with respect to its condition. But one
can think of a variety of situations in the halfway zone. What of
a shore-based crane employed in loading a ship when its defective
condition causes a bag of beans to fall on a longshoreman working
on the pier? What of equipment that goes on and off the ship? If
the unfitness of a fork-lift furnished by the stevedores manifests it-
self on the pier before it has been aboard the ship, going up the
gangplank, or on the pier after being on the ship, is the shipowner
liable?
Another question left to be answered is whether the cargo proper,
as distinct from the cargo containers, is "a thing about a ship" under
the Gutierrez case. There seemed to be a studied avoidance by the
Court of placing cargo on the list. In his dissenting opinion Mr.
Justice Harlan pointed out that the Court decided in Morales v.
City of Galveston"8 that a workman asphyxiated in the hold of a
ship because of a "shot" of contaminated grain could not recover
from the shipowner on the ground of unseaworthiness, the hold
being seaworthy despite the absence of a ventilator system. Mr.
Justice Harlan could not understand why, if the shipowner war-
rants the condition of the cargo, the Court, including Justices
Brennan, Clark, Stewart, and White of the Gutierrez majority, de-
cided the way it did in Morales, or why the argument that the grain
itself was unseaworthy totally escaped Justices Black, Douglas, and
Warren, who had dissented on the ground that a ship in the grain
trade, where asphyxiation from fumigated grain occurs from time
to time, is unseaworthy if it has no forced ventilation system in the
hold.
There are two at least nominal differences between the Morales
and Gutierrez cases. It is possible to distinguish them on Judge
Friendly's point of distinction between Gutierrez and Forkin. In
Morales the contaminated grain was not furnished by the ship; it
17 323 F. 2d at 641.
18 370 U.S. 165 (1962).
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was, in the words of the Court, "a noxious agent from without."'
In Gutierrez by contrast, insofar as the longshoremen were con-
cerned the bags were furnished by the ship. The other point of
distinction is, of course, that while there is an analogy to be drawn,
specious though it may be, between the bags in which beans are
carried off the ship and the gear employed in unloading, no such
analogy applies to cargo proper. In 1962, before Gutierrez, but
after Ellerman, the district court in Oregon in the Bell case20 held
that the shipowner was not liable for injuries resulting from the
breaking of a log being loaded on the ship when the log broke
because of a latent defect, even though the accident occurred on
board the ship. Without indicating agreement with extensions to
date, Judge W. T. Beeks distinguished the Ellerman case by noting
that in that case the band that broke "was utilized by the stevedore
instead of a sling or pallet board in performing an obligation of the
ship, the discharge of the cargo therefrom. The result is not differ-
ent than the stevedores having supplied a defective pallet board
.. . or a defective tong ... 21 Judge Beeks also mentioned the
difference between loading and unloading, observing that in the
cases in which liability had been imposed, the equipment had been
on board long enough to be considered an integral part of the ship's
gear.
Whether either of these limitations on the extent of the principle
enunciated in the Gutierrez case ultimately will prevail is a question
for the future. Certainly they are both consistent with the holding
in Gutierrez, and with much of the language of Mr. Justice White's
opinion. Whether they are compatible with the more or less un-
principled paternalism that the Court likes to refer to as its "broad
humanitarian policy" is less certain. There is no reason to suppose
that the longshoreman in Forkin was any more or less in need of
full compensation after the equipment was affixed to the ship, or
that the longshoreman in Bell was injured less by having a log fall
on him, than their counterpart who slipped on the beans in
Gutierrez.
The second count in the Gutierrez case was predicated upon
19 Id. at 171.
20 Bell v. Nihonkai Kisen, K.K., 204 F. Supp. 230 (D. Ore. 1962).
21 Id. at 233-34.
E1964
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negligence. The district court found that the shipowner was negli-
gent in permitting the beans to be unloaded in their defective bags
"when it knew or should have known that injury was likely to
result."22 As Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out, this finding begs the
question, for it is not constructive knowledge that defective bag-
ging produces injuries that grounds a finding of negligence, but
constructive knowledge that the bagging is defective. Mr. Justice
White's treatment of this aspect of the case is puzzling. At one point
he stated that ". . . the trial court was entitled to infer that re-
spondent should have known of the defective condition of the
bagging when the beans were leaking while still in the ship, when
beans spilled out of the bags throughout unloading, and when
coopers were sent aboard to repair the torn bagging." 23 This indi-
cates that the condition of the bags was so notorious that the ship-
owner was put on notice. But he concluded his discussion of the
negligence count with the observation that the shipowner "had an
absolute and nondelegable duty of care toward petitioner not to
create this risk to him, which it failed to meet. When this lack of
care culminated in petitioner's injury, respondent became legally
liable to compensate him for the harm. ' 24 If the absolute and non-
delegable duty of care is the duty to provide seaworthy equipment,
including cargo containers, Mr. Justice White was merely con-
fusing the negligence and unseaworthiness issues. On the other
hand, if he was speaking of some other duty of care, where did it
arise? He may have been suggesting that independently of whether
the ship or its gear is unseaworthy, the shipowner has a duty to take
precautions to see that whatever it releases to the longshoremen is
not dangerous. This, it will be noted, would include cargo as well
as containers. But if this duty is not covered under the warranty
of seaworthiness, when did it become absolute and non-delegable?
Further, the discussion is internally inconsistent, for if the duty is
absolute, why does it depend upon the fact that the notoriety of
the leaking bags constituted constructive notice?
The distinction is of some importance. In Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer25 the shipowner was held liable under the unseaworthiness
doctrine when a longshoreman slipped on fish gurry left on the
22 373 U.S. at 210. 24 Id. at 211-12.
23 Id. at 211. 25 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
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railing of the ship in the course of unloading a cargo of fish, despite
the fact that there was no showing that the condition had existed
for a sufficient time to give the ship's officers constructive notice.
Because the condition existed on the ship itself, the Court could
find the ship unseaworthy. Suppose that in addition to the ship's
railing, fish gurry had been slopped around the pier in the
course of unloading, not a very strained supposition. It would be
difficult to say that fish gurry is a cargo container or any variety
of ship's equipment, proper or pro hac vice. It would be equally
bizarre to find that it was not fit for the particular use to which it
was put. If the shipowner has a duty of care that extends to the
general locale of unloading, and the duty is non-delegable, pre-
sumably if the condition were notorious enough to put the ship's
officers on notice, he would be liable for accidents occasioned by
his failure to clean it up.2 6 If the duty is absolute, no level of care
would suffice, and the shipowner would be insurer of the safety
of the pier.
II. THE HA BoR WoRxERs' COMPENSATION AcT-
THE LONGSHOREMN'S MAINTENANCE AND CURE
In extending the shipowner's liability without fault to acci-
dents arising on land, and his warranty of the ship and its equipment
to cargo containers, the Court took a long step toward assuring
longshoremen the benefit of jury damages27 for accidents occurring
during the loading and unloading of ships. It was able to do this,
however, because of the third-party exception to the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.2 8
This act provides longshoremen with limited relief similar to state
workmen's compensation remedies for accidents occurring in the
course of their employment. Its provisions apply whether or not
the longshoreman is on the ship or the shore, and regardless of
whether he is engaged in a "seaman's work." Section 5 of the act
2 6 In Gutierrez, the point was made that the shipowner had no control of the
impact zone. Mr. Justice White held that the question could be put aside because
control was not necessary, but wrote in passing, 'We doubt that respondent had
no license to go upon the pier at which it was docked and clean up the loose beans,
if it had wanted to... "' 373 U.S. at 211.
27 See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
28 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, 44 Star. 1424 (1927).
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provides that the "liability of an employer prescribed in section 904
of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of
such employer to the employee .. at law or in admiralty on ac-
count of such injury or death... . "29 Section 33 preserves the sea-
man's claim against third parties who may be liable for damages,
and the Sieracki doctrine became important because normally the
longshoreman works for a contract stevedore, and therefore is not
barred by the act from suing the shipowner for his negligence or
breach of duty to provide seaworthy appliances. In Reed v. The
Yaka,30 the longshoreman was employed by the bareboat charterer
of the ship. He libeled the ship on the theory that the duty to pro-
vide a seaworthy vessel with seaworthy gear being non-delegable,
the ship, and, through it the shipowner, were liable for the failure
of the ship's gear despite the demise of the vessel, a question re-
served in 1962 in Guzman v. Pichirilo.31 The Court again reserved
judgment on this issue and held, over the dissent of Justices Harlan
and Stewart, that the charterer-employer of the longshoreman was
liable to him in an action for unseaworthiness despite the plain
wording of the statute.
The opinion was written by Mr. Justice Black. He noted that
over his objections the Court had held in the Ryan case and cases
extending the Ryan doctrine that a shipowner who had been forced
to pay damages to an employee of a contract stevedore under the
Sieracki doctrine could recoup his losses in a third-party action
against the stevedore, predicated upon an implied warranty of
workmanlike service in the stevedoring contract. If this be true,
Mr. Justice Black reasoned, the argument that the result of the
action for unseaworthiness is to tax the stevedore with liability over
and above the limits imposed by the Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act is unavailing. He saw no economic difference between
full liability in cases of independent contractor operations and lia-
bility when the employment relationship is direct. Congress must
have been aware of the Sieracki case and the Ryan case and had
not amended the act. Therefore the act must be interpreted in the
light of these cases and the dominant purpose of the legislation,
20 33 U.S.C. § 905.
30 373 U.S. 410 (1963). 31369 U.S. 698 (1962).
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to help longshoremen. That purpose must not be thwarted by
"blind adherence to the superficial meaning of a statute."3 2
In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart, pointed out that whatever the propriety of the
Sieracki and Ryan cases, they did not go directly in the teeth of
the plain meaning of the easily understood provisions of a statute.
If "exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer
to the employee.., at law or in admiralty.. ." meant only "super-
ficially" that the employee could not bring an independent action
against the employer based upon maritime tort principles, Mr.
Justice Harlan wondered what the "true" purpose of the statute
might be.
And well he might, for The Yaka is nothing less than naked
nullification. In all probability it will cause but small ripples in mari-
time personal injury litigation, for very few cases seem to involve
longshoremen employed directly by the shipowner. It is also true
that the majority could have achieved the same result by more
devious means, for it could have held the owner liable despite the
charter, thus setting up a third-party relationship to take the case
from under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act, and then require the charterer to indemnify
the owner under an implied warranty in the charter. The Court
has demonstrated that these implied warranties can be pulled out
like rabbits from a hat. It is not the result, then, but the bald arro-
gance of the decision that is startling, for it shows that when it
runs out of periphrases the Court is ready simply to rewrite the
statutes.
In Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Steve-
doring Co.,33 referred to by the Ninth Circuit (understandably
enough) as Griffith's Case,34 Griffith was a longshoreman employed
by an independent contractor in unloading a ship owned by Italia
when he was injured by the failure of a rope that had been pro-
vided by his employer. The rope broke because of a latent defect.
Under the Petterson doctrine, Griffith recovered from Italia on the
theory of unseaworthiness. Then Italia sued Oregon, Griffith's
32 373 U.S. at 415.
33 376 U.S. 315 (1964).
84 310 F. 2d 481 (9th Cir. 1962).
[1964
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employer, for a breach of the latter's warranty of workmanlike
service under the Ryan doctrine.
Until Griffitb's Case, the Supreme Court litigation under the
Ryan doctrine had been confined to cases in which the stevedore
employer had been negligent, the theory being that the stevedoring
contract contained an implied warranty that the stevedore would
perform his duties under the contract in a workmanlike way, and
that a breach of this warranty that resulted in the shipowner's lia-
bility to the stevedore's employees would ground an action. Grif-
fith's Case raised the question whether the shipowner would be
indemnified against liability to the stevedore's employees incurred
because of the absolute nature of the warranty of seaworthiness,
where no fault on the part of the stevedore could be shown.
The Court split six to three. Mr. Justice White, for the majority,
held that the third-party action would lie. He pointed out that the
Ryan doctrine was designed to shift the risk to the segment of the
industry best able to minimize it, and that ropes break either be-
cause of original defects or age, and that in either event, through
periodic tests or accelerated retirement schedules, the stevedore
could best reduce the occurrence of such accidents.
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas and the Chief
Justice, felt that while the Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
did not stand in the way of making the shipowner liable to the
longshoreman, it was enacted to protect the stevedore, his employer,
against liability beyond that specified in the act. He thought the
Ryan case itself had produced an unwarranted extension of that
liability, but if justifiable at all, it could be supported only on the
theory of contract. To read into a service contract an absolute
indemnity from liability was not only violative of the intent of
the Congress in enacting the Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
but likely to cause confusion in the law of warranty in areas other
than the admiralty.35
These three cases have some interesting interrelationships.
Though the Gutierrez case does not involve directly the Ryan doc-
trine, it is hard to believe that if the shipowner was negligent in
permitting the unloading of the beans, the stevedore was not sinii-
larly negligent. Put together, then, Gutierrez and Griffith at the
35 376 U.S. at 326.
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same time extend both the sphere of the shipowner's absolute lia-
bilities and the stevedore's duty to reimburse him for his losses.
Thus, while The Yaka disemboweled the Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act's exclusive remedy provision in the direct employer
relationship, Gutierrez and Griffith, though less directly contradic-
tory of the words of the statute, accomplished much the same result
in the independent contractor relationship.
That the statute, no doubt designed to provide the sum and total
of a longshoreman's recovery for injuries produced without third-
party negligence, is now no more than the longshoreman's main-
tenance and cure seems certain. All that remains to be discovered
is who killed it. Mr. Justice Black attributed the death to Ryan and
Griffith.36 Mr. Justice Harlan accused Yaka and Petterson.37
Any post-mortem of the Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
must begin with the essential difference between the statutory pat-
tern for solution of the problem of industrial accidents within the
shipping industry and the Court's view of that problem. For reasons
of its own, Congress has chosen not to view the entire industry as
a unit for the purpose of designing such a solution. It has followed
the Supreme Court's distinction between shrimps and oysters. 6 A
seaman is a shrimp, a free-swimming fish; the longshoreman is an
oyster, living in beds along the coast. Congress has cast its legisla-
tion to reflect this difference. For a quarter of a century the Su-
preme Court has doggedly refused to accept this distinction and
has set about to bring equality of treatment to workers in the ship-
ping industry.
The principles that underlie the Sieracki and Ryan cases were
stated with candor by the late Judge Clark in DeGioia v. United
States Lines.3 9 The function of Mahnich and Sieracki, wrote Judge
Clark, is the "allocation of losses caused by shipboard injuries to
the enterprise." The function of the doctrine of indemnity an-
nounced in the Ryan case is the allocation "within the several
segments of the enterprise, to the institution or institutions most
able to minimize the particular risk involved. 40
36 Ibid. 37373 U.S. at 416.
38 Compare Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), 'with McCready v. Virginia,
94 U.S. 391 (1876).
39 304 F. 2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962). 40 1d. at 426.
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These principles are old ones in the civil law41 and have been
common in our statutory law for over half a century.4 A sensible
system for their implementation would provide for absolute lia-
bility on the part of the employer within the industry, with an
action over against the person whose negligence caused the injury
(when it was produced by negligence), or against the owner or
person who controlled the premises, or provided the tools and
equipment (when the injury was the product of unsafe working
conditions). If insurance rates are fixed on the basis of individual
accident experience, perhaps even the third-party action could be
rejected on the theory that the contracting party will select his
contractors with an eye to reducing his costs. Such a system could
be provided with or without limitations on the amount of awards,
with or without compulsory insurance, and with or without imple-
mentation by administrative process.
Several things make it difficult for courts to work out such a
system. In the first place, the entire shipping industry is not within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus
a longshoreman who is working on land when the injury occurs
and is not employed in the business of any particular ship has re-
course only to landsmen's remedies. His redress must be at com-
mon law or its statutory modifications. This is an irrational distinc-
tion, of course, for no commanding difference between wet torts
and dry torts commends itself to the intellect. In the second place,
while legislative allocation of liability is actio imperium and not
to be questioned unless it represents an excess of power, presumably
judge-made law follows a course of reasoned decision. If the Con-
gress chooses to provide a special set of tort rules for the interstate
employees in the railroad industry, for instance, and not to apply
them to interstate truckers,43 we may think it queer, but not wrong.
When a court so singles out a particular segment of the citizenry,
on the other hand, we feel free to inquire, "By what mode of
reasoning did they arrive at that conclusion?" And back we go to
the Law of the Rhodians.
41 See, e.g., Sci-msrm , Tim PRIcIPLEs oF Gav.A2N Crvli. LAw 262 et seq. (1907).
42 See 1 LAwoSN, WoRamEN's COMPENSATION LAW 32 (1952).
43 See Latzko v. National Carloading Corp., 192 F. 2d 905 (6th Cir. 1951).
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III. BACKGROUND OF THE OSCEOLA
The present struggle over industry-wide solution of the
industrial accident in commercial shipping goes back, if not to the
Law of the Rhodians, at least to 1789 when "cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction" were defined as within "the judicial
power of the United States. '44 In the case of The Lottawana45
Mr. Justice Bradley observed that the Constitution "assumes that
the meaning of the phrase 'admiralty and maritime jurisdiction' is
well understood." '46 And so no effort was made to define it. But
certainly this was one of the more fatuous assumptions the Found-
ing Fathers made. In point of fact nobody understood it and few
pretended to understand it.
In 1789, the jurisdiction of the English High Court of Admiralty
was at a low ebb, encompassing almost nothing more than occur-
rences on the high seas.47 For a number of reasons it might have
44 U.S. CONSr. art. III, § 2.
45 21 Wall. 558 (1875). 46 Id. at 574-75.
47 The subject was quite settled by the time of the American Revolution but
seems to have left some touchy feelings. In his introduction to the 9th edition,
published in 1769, Molloy stated: "In the whole Work I have nowhere meddled
with the Admiralty or its jurisdiction (unless by the by, as incidentally falling in
with other Matters) knowing well, that it would have been impertinent and saucy
in me to enter into the Debate of Imperium merum, Imperium mixtwn, Jurisdictio
simplex, and the like, and of the bounding out of Jurisdictions, which in effect
tends to question the Government, and trip up the Power that gives Laws and
Protection to us... " 1 MOLLOY, DE JuR MAmuTimo xxiv (9th ed. 1769) (hereafter
MOLLOY). Earlier, broader definitions of admiralty jurisdiction had been expunged
from the books. The first edition of Croke's Reports included the alleged agree-
ment between the judges of law and admiralty made in the King's presence in
1575 and later repudiated by Coke. The 1742 edition leaves them out, inserting a
mantissa stating "Page 296. Resolution upon the Cases of Admiralty jurisdiction.
Nota, These were not judicial resolutions, and therefore not authentic. Vide an
ordinance 12 Aprilis, 1647, touching the same." 3 Cro. Car. xvi (1742). See 2 BROWNE,
ADmALTY 79 (1840) (hereafter BRowNE), where they are set out with a note to
the effect that they were left out of the later editions of Croke, "seemingly ex
industria," but were included in Zouch on the Admiralty jurisdiction. This his-
tory was known to Judge Hopkinson in Pennsylvania in 1781. See Clinton v. Brig
Hannah, Bee 419 (1781). It was discovered by Judge Drayton in South Carolina
through conflicting citations to Croke's Reports. Shrewsbury v. Sloop Two Friends,
Bee 433 (1786). It seems to have become lost knowledge. Judge Peters cited Cro.
Car. 296 as authority in Gardner v. Ship New Jersey, 1 Pet. Adm. 223 (1806), citing
Rou=n AaR. 534, and apparently taking his Cro. Car. citation from the Bacon Abr.
180, 5th ed., seemingly wholly oblivious of what the citation referred to.
[1964
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been predicted that the 1789 jurisdiction of the English admiralty
would not be taken as the measure of the federal jurisdiction under
our constitutional phrase. In England the long and sometimes acrid
dispute which resulted in the line between law and admiralty was
a fight between a common-law court equipped with the power of
prohibition and sitting as the central organ of English law on the one
side and a specialized admiralty court administering the vestigial
remains of the civil law on the other. In America the legions were
on the other side. The jurisdiction of the national courts varied
directly with the breadth of the admiralty. There were extant
several disquisitions by noted English civilians on the outrageous
behavior of the Court of the King's Bench in wrecking the admiral-
ty jurisdiction with its prohibitions,"' and these provided a basis for
the early determination that "cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction" meant what the English admiralty jurisdiction would have
been if Coke had been a gentleman.a
Had we adhered to the English pattern, it would have been diffi-
cult enough to divine guiding substantive principles in maritime
law. The High Court of Admiralty was said to have operated gen-
erally on civilian principles, 50 though this has been denied. 1 In any
event the Roman sources were almost non-existent, and England
never adopted either a general civil code or a maritime code.52 It
was thought that it was guided by the ancient sea codes, particular-
48 See DeLovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398 (C.C. Mass. 1815), where Mr. Justice Story's
discourse is larded throughout with Godolphin, Prynne, Spelman, and Zouch.
49 See ConE, JuiuscrioN oF CouRTs 136, 4th INsr. (1797). Clearly Mr. Justice
Story thought that Lord Coke "ratted out" on the agreement of 1575, a judgment
shared by Sir Leoline Jenkins. See 2 BnowNE 77 (1840).
8 O DuNi.p, ADnmmALTY PRActicE 85 (2d ed. 1850).
51 See 1 MoLLoy xxi: "Place amongst others of the Ancient Romans as well as
the modern, yet have they not all received by Custom such a Force as may make
them Laws, but remain only as they have the Authority in Shew of Reason, which
binds not always alike, but varies according to Circumstances of Time, Place, State,
Age, and what other Conveniences of Inconveniences meet with it...."
52 See STORy, MIscEr.NEOus WrrINGs 248-49 (1835): "Yet, how narrow is the
compass, within which the whole maritime law of Rome is compressed! It scarcely
fills a half dozen short tides of the Pandects, and about as many in the Justinian
Code, mixed up with matter properly appertaining to other subjects." Browne de-
votes four pages to setting out the Roman maritime law and concludes, "Sterile,
then, is the naval law of Rome." 2 BRowNE 38 (1840).
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ly the Laws of Oleron,55 but only insofar as they were consistent
with English law and custom.54 It is said that they were guided by
the continental treatises on maritime law.55 Yet Sir James Marriott,
judge of the High Court of Admiralty at the time of the American
Revolution, characterized Bynkershoek, Hiuberous, Vatel, Hubner,
Schlegel Busch, Heineccius, Grotius, and Pufendorf as "men who
have written to serve a particular private personal, or otherwise
some public political purpose," and went on to note: 51
It is well known that in the foreign universities that whoso-
ever takes a degree (and degrees are mostly taken in Law)
print and publish Theses which they make or are made for
them. Nothing can be more ridiculous, when it is as notorious
that a thesis may be bought, as well as burghers briefs and
false passes, for one or a few rix-dollars, than to see such things
dressed up with all the professional pedantry of learning, and
the authors as theatrically antiquated as if they appeared in
trunk hose, jackboots, slashed doublets, great slouched hats
and feathers, ruffs or bands.
Recourse to the records of the High Court and of the Court of the
Judges Delegates made available in the latter part of the nineteenth
century 57 lend more than a touch of support to Sir James's skep-
53 SToaY, op. cit. supra note 52, at 39, where it is stated that the Laws of Oleron
were established by Richard I, continued by John, and promulgated anew in the
50th of Henry III, and received their ultimate confirmation in the 12th of Edward I.
54 1 MOLLOY xxi: "Nor have those Laws, instituted at Oleron, obtained any other
or greater Force than those of Rhodes or Imperial, considered only from the Rea-
son the which are not become Laws by any particular Custom or Constitution, but
only esteemed and valued by the Reasons found in them, and applied to the Case
emergent."
55 Indeed if the ancient codes were employed as a source of reason, it was in-
evitable that the European commentaries would be referred to, for the English
texts were relatively late in coming. Molloy acknowledged debt to Petrus Pekius
the Zealander, Locinlus, Vinius, Garasias, Ferrand, and Cleriack.
56 1 Hay & Marriott xxxi-xxxii (1801). Sir James attributed much of the com-
plication of the simple idea of justice to the fact that "German and Dutch '1zag-
nificent' professors as they call themselves, and who in general are only school
masters, are the numerous and principal writers on the laws ecclesiastical, civil,
and of nature, and of nations." He did not have much good to say of the common
law either, describing the reports as "chiefly the reports of illiterate clerks who
misunderstand, and which mark the low characters of the writers who perpetuate
'much bad reasoning in much bad language.'" Id. at xxix-xxx.
57 Mars. Adm. (1885); 11 SELDEN Socmny, SELECr PLEAs IN Tm CoURT oF AD-
MIRALTY, 1547-1602 (1897). In the Marsden collection, there is an occasional refer-
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ticism. Certainly many of them are decided on English law and
principle, and case to case. The High Court of Admiralty was not
a court of record, however, and its first published opinions appeared
in 1801, covering the period beginning with the judgments of Sir
William Scott in the Michaelmas term, 1798./
This means that the first American admiralty judges were called
upon to give continuity to law that was more or less civilian in
flavor without any code, administered by a more or less common-
law process without any cases. Precedents were understandably
scarce and judges foraged for "law" anywhere they could find it.
In 1795, Judge Peters of the Pennsylvania district, after naming
every ancient code he could think of and marking the age and ob-
vious wisdom employed in each, but adding a footnote to the effect
that there were, of course, many more, suggested that it was safer
to follow those collections of ancient wisdom "than to trust entire-
ly to the varying and crooked line of discretion." He added, how-
ever, that the court would not exclude "more modern expositions,
or adjudged cases," and concluded that he was anxious for any
light he could obtain from "any respectable sources." 9
The problem was not limited to this shortage of reasonably con-
temporary authorities in those areas within the jurisdiction of the
High Court of Admiralty. Since the definitions of "admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction" encompassed a large number of disputes that
had for a century been litigated only in the common-law courts,
judges were faced with a doctrinal dilemma. Since they had fol-
lowed the teaching of the learned doctors of the civil law on the
"proper" jurisdiction, were they to apply the "general maritime
law" to the entire jurisdiction, looking for doctrinal principle in
the ancient codes and "any respectable source," or to follow the
common-law precedents in the areas in which they covered matters
of common law by English standards but maritime under our con-
stitutional phrase as interpreted?
ence to textual authority, but the vast majority of cases are argued without refer-
ence to either cases or texts.
58 1 C. Rob. (1801). The same year, Sir James Marriott published the Hay and
Marriott Reports. The decision to publish reports beginning with the decisions of
Sir William Scott apparently led Sir James to take steps to preserve some of his
own. The Hay and Marriott Reports contain about fifty cases dating back to 1776.
69 See Thompson v. The Ship Catharina, 1 Pet. 104, 111, 113 (1795).
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In many cases the English common law and maritime substantive
law were the same. In one respect, however, the rules were differ-
ent. This was the area of liens. At common law there was no lien
for services and an artisan's lien was possessory only. In admiralty,
there was a lien for services and provision of supplies, independent
of possession.60 As a consequence, when such contracts were en-
tered into in England, no lien existed because the creditor had no
access to the High Court of Admiralty. This was true whether the
ship was foreign or domestic."-
This problem of the materialman's lien proved a peculiarly
troublesome one. First it was solved by making a distinction be-
tween domestic and foreign ships. 62 This solution was not the civil
law or admiralty rule; nor was it the common-law rule. It probably
stemmed from confusion between the power expressly to hypoth-
ecate a vessel and the question whether provision of necessaries on
credit resulted in an implied hypothecation. These are not the same
questions because the bottomry bond, the instrument of express
hypothecation, generally carried marine interest, sometimes three
or four times as great as the ordinary interest rate. It was held,
therefore, that a master could not enter into a bottomry bond in
the home country, because the owner should be consulted before
he was called upon to pay marine interest. In a foreign port it was
held that the master could hypothecate the vessel if the money was
necessary to the completion of the voyage, the owner had no agent
in the port, and efforts to obtain money on ordinary loans were
unsuccessful." The fact that our courts probably misread the Eng-
60 See ABBorr, MERcHANT SIPs AND SEvAmN 103 (1st ed. 1802) (hereafter AnBorr),
citing The Digest, though this is said by Parsons to have been proved incorrect.
2 PARSONS, SHIPPING LAw 322 (1869) (hereafter PARsoNs).
61 ABBO-r 103. See Justin v. Ballam, 2 Lord Raym. 805 (K.B. 1702). In 1840,
Browne observed: "I can scarcely conceive that such a determination would be
made now, when the same irrational jealousy of the admiralty doth not exist." 2
BROWNE 80 n.10.
62 Cf. The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438, 443 (1819). See Zane v. Brig President,
4 Wash. 453 (C.C. Pa. 1824), in which Mr. Justice Washington posed the dilemma
and cut the baby in half by permitting a suit for proceeds in the registry on
authority of Sir William Scott's opinion in The John, 3 C. Rob. 288 (Adm. 1801),
a decision later explained as depending upon the absence of opposition. See The
Maitland, 2 Hagg. Adm. 253 (1829); The Neptune, 3 Knapp 94 (P.C. 1835).
63 See ABBott 112 et seq.; PARK, MARINE INsURAwcE 410 et seq. (1801).
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lish law on the subject of implied hypothecation is less important
than the fact that they thought that they were following it, for
the materialman's lien problem posed the general question of what
sources of substantive law were to be applied in cases maritime
within our definition but not adjudicated in the High Court of
Admiralty in 1789. The reasoning proceeded in the following steps:
(1) Home port materialmen could not sue in the High Court of
Admiralty. (2) Therefore, no lien existed in their favor. (3) Thus,
though the contract was maritime under our definitions, admiralty
jurisdiction existed only in personam, and not in rem. It should be
noted that this resulted in the application of the "general maritime
law" in the strict sense of the term to matters that were within the
narrowed jurisdiction of the English admiralty court, and the "do-
mestic" maritime law to the areas outside that jurisdiction but
within our constitutional definition of maritime.
The reasoning is not as easily applied to torts as to contracts, for
while our definition of admiralty jurisdiction in contract was a
subject-matter definition, the tort jurisdiction was early supposed
to rest purely upon location,64 although until today there had been
some doubt about this. 5 In the case of contracts, it could be said
that location is a variety of substance. The availability of the owner,
for example, changes our thinking about the breadth of agency of
the master. With torts, however, in most instances the location is
not logically connected with the wrongness of the conduct, at least
(4 See De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398 (C.C. Mass. 1815).
05 See BENEDicr, ADMIRALTY 173 (1850): "It may, however, be doubted whether
the civil jurisdiction, in cases of torts, does not depend upon the relation of the
parties to a ship or vessel, embracing only those tortious violation[s] of maritime
right and duty which occur in vessels to which the Admiralty jurisdiction, in cases
of contracts, applies. If one of several landsmen bathing in the sea. should assault,
or imprison, or rob another, it has not been held here that the Admiralty would
have jurisdiction of the action for the tort." This passage, referred to by Judge
Hough as "Erastus Benedict's celebrated doubt," had a brief revival in the twentieth
century in McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. N.Y. 1961),
where the libelant was injured while bathing at a public beach; and in Weinstein
v. Eastern Airlines, 203 F. Supp. 430 (ED. Pa. 1962), where a land-based aircraft
fell into navigable waters. The Weinstein case was reversed by the court of ap-
peals, Judge Biggs holding for the locality rule, though preserving the bather case
on the ground that the water was shallow and probably unnavigable in fact. Wein-
stein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F. 2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. den., 375 U.S. 940
(1963).
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insofar as a distinction is drawn between the high seas, the flux and
reflux of the tide, and navigable waters. Furthermore, the provisions
of the ancient codes and the discussions in available textual treat-
ment dealing with torts were almost completely limited to collisions
between vessels. 66 By the time collision cases appear in any
numbers, the available texts of the day made plain the jurisdiction
of the High Court in such cases, and the substantive rules that were
to be applied. 7 Without much hesitation, these rules, such as the
division of damages rule were applied in American admiralty courts
to collision cases that would have been relegated to the common-
law courts in England.68
In tort cases other than collision cases there is no reason to sup-
pose that the courts applied a different substantive law than was
applied in ordinary common-law actions. There is, however, very
66 See Art. XIV of The Laws of Oleron. This and Art. XV, providing rules for
anchoring in harbor, both deal with moored vessels. There is no provision for
damages due to accidents at sea. The Laws of Wisbuy repeat these provisions and
add Art. LXVII, which provides that if two vessels strike one another and one
perishes, the two shall be liable for the merchandise that is lost or damaged. See
note 176 infra. Marsden identifies The Thomas and The John, Mars. Adm. 235
(1648), as the first English case in which the split-damage rule was applied. That
other tort cases were brought in admiralty is certain, as Marsden lists tvo dozen
of them, noting that most were personal actions for injury to person and property.
The only ones in which any facts are given are either for ill usage, or for detain-
ing a seaman's chest. Id. at 311-12.
67Prior to the middle of the nineteenth century the texts devoted little or no
space to collision. There is no such heading in ABBoTT as late as the 5th edition in
1827, though an inference of liability can be drawn from the discussion of limita-
tion of liability. By the time of the publication of the 11th edition in 1867, 22 pages
were devoted to the subject. Other mid-century texts also discussed the topic.
See 2 BROwNE 201 et seq.; 1 CoNKLING, ADMIRALTY 21 (1848); 1 PARsoNs 525 et seq.
The earliest American collision cases seem to have been brought at law. See, e.g.,
Stone v. Ketland, 1 Wash. C.C. 142 (C.C. Pa. 1804). In England the jurisdictional
line was drawn at the high seas, and collisions occurring infra corpus cornitatus were
cognizable only at common law. See The Public Opinion, 2 Hagg. Adm. 398 (1832).
By the time of the decision of The Public Opinion, however, the divided damages
rule had made its way into the published admiralty reports. The Woodrop-Sims,
2 Dods. 83 (1815).
68 In The Public Opinion, a case dealing with a collision occurring infra corpus
comitatus, Sir Christopher Robinson cited no case authority, but felt that "it is
my duty not to adventure beyond the known limits of my authority; and I should
only involve the parties in expense and disappointment, were I to encourage any
such experiment... ." 2 Hagg. Adm. at 403.
[1964
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little to go on. There are a few trespass cases recorded without
details, but the law of negligence as applied to the master-servant
relationship was half a century in the future when our Constitution
was adopted. An injured party who had an action at common law
presumably preferred to bring it there because he was entitled to
a jury trial. If he had no common-law action, there was no author-
ity for the argument that he had a remedy in admiralty. Perhaps
for this reason discourse over the maritime law of personal injury
was late in coming. By the time it did come, the common law had
undergone considerable development.
With Priestley v. Fowler,69 which established the fellow-servant
doctrine, in 1837, the common-law courts began to struggle with
the definition of duties owed to servants by masters. It should be
remembered that in the Priestley case Lord Abinger began by
pointing out that no precedents existed and observed:70 "We are
therefore to decide the question on general principles, and in doing
so we are at liberty to look at the consequences of a decision the
one way or the other." In Baker v. Bolton in 1808,71 it was decided
that the common law afforded no remedy for wrongful death.
The Priestley case was followed in 1842 by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Farwell v. Boston and Worcester Rail-
road Corporation,72 and the Bolton case found its way into Ameri-
can law in the opinion of the same court in Carey v. Berkshire
Railroad Co. in 1848.73
Since there were no precedents on the subject in the literature
on admiralty and maritime law, and since these decisions were novel
decisions based upon judicial reasoning of the day, there was no
reason to suppose that they would not be applied as freely in ad-
miralty as in law. In this connection it is interesting to note that
the Priestley case was not noticed in the first edition of Story on
Agency, 74 but Priestley and Farwell were both discussed at some
69 3 M. & W. 1 (Exch. 1837). See CROSS, PRECEDENr iN ENGLISH LAW 66-67, 219-20
(1961).
703 M.&W. at 5.
71 1 Campbell 493 (D. Md. 1808).
72 4 Metc. 49 (Mass. 1842).
73 1 Cush. 475 (Mass. 1848).
74 It was published in 1839, two years after the decision in Priestley.
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length in the third. 5 Examples of their possible application mixed
ships, factors, carpenters, and coachmen indiscriminately.
The Baker case was the first to reach the Supreme Court. In a
number of lower court cases, the most important of which was The
Sea Gull,76 decided by Mr. Justice Chase sitting on circuit in
Baltimore, in 1867, the rule was not applied. Conceding that Baker
and Carey were against the existence of the action, Mr. Chief
Justice Chase noted that other states had not followed these deci-
sions and that after they were decided the legislatures of both
England and Massachusetts had "corrected" the law. 77 He went on
to take issue with the fairness of the Baker rule, concluding: 7
"[C]ertainly it better becomes the humane and liberal character of
proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy,
when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible
rules."
By the time the principle adjudicated in The Sea Gull reached
the Supreme Court of the United States in The Harisburg,79 nearly
two decades had elapsed. In that time the Baker doctrine had been
adopted generally by the state courts, 0 and in Insurance Co. v.
Brame,1 had been applied by the Supreme Court in a common-law
case. In applying it in admiralty, the Court observed that there was
no authority whatever for the proposition that the doctrine was
different in admiralty than at common law, and that since it had
been generally accepted as the law in the United States, and adopted
by the Supreme Court after full discussion, there was no reason
why it should not be applied in admiralty as well as common law. 2
The Sea Gull was disposed of as resting upon Mr. Chief Justice
Chase's dislike for the rule itself and his supposition that it had not
been adopted. By the time Insurance Co. v. Brame was decided, he
was no longer on the Court, so we do not know whether he would
75 STORY, AGENCY 573 (3d ed. 1846).
7 6 Chase's C.C. 145 (C.C. Md. 1867).
77 Id. at 148.
78 Ibid. 79 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
8O E.g., Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 209 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1838), one of the cases on
which Mr. Justice Chase depended in The Sea Gull, was substantially overruled in
Green v. Hudson River Railroad, 2 Keyes 294 (N.Y. 1866).
8195 U.S. 754 (1877). 82 119 U.S. at 204.
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have opposed the adoption of the rule at common law. The decision
was unanimous, however, as was to be expected. If the Court felt
that the rule was correct, there was no reason to make a special case
of the admiralty jurisdiction.
IV. THE OscEoLA
The rule in Priestley v. Fowler did not reach the Supreme
Court in an admiralty case until 1903 in the celebrated case of The
Osceola.s3 Like the rule in Baker v. Bolton,84 it had had a mixed
reception in the district courts and circuit courts of appeals.85 By
that time the fellow-servant rule had been ameliorated a good deal
by the development of a number of exceptions such as the vice-
principal doctrine"' and the safe-place-to-work doctrine.8 7 None
of the cases had flatly rejected its application in admiralty and per-
mitted recovery of damages by an injured seaman, but a great deal
of disagreement existed over the circumstances under which it
would warrant recovery.8 8 In Quebec Steamship Co. v. Merchant,8 9
a case at common law in 1890, Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking for
a unanimous court, had applied it to a crew member injured on
shipboard almost two miles off the shore of Trinidad.
The Osceola was distinguishable from Quebec Steamship Co.
in two respects. In the first place, the injury took place within
83 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
84 1 Campbell 493 (D. Md. 1808).
86 Compare Daub v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 18 Fed. 625 (D. Ore. 1883), with
Red River Line v. Cheatham, 60 Fed. 517 (5th Cir. 1894). The cases had generally
supported the application of the doctrine. See Cunningham, The Extension to the
Admiralty of the Fellow Servant Doctrine, 18 HARV. L. REv. 294, 296 (1905).
86 See C. M. & St. P.R.Co. v. Ross 112 US. 377 (1884); The Titan, 23 Fed. 413
(S.D. N.Y. 1885); Kalleck v. Deering, 161 Mass. 469 (1894). In Kalleck, Mr. Justice
Holmes explained the admiralty cases permitting recovery by reference to Ross,
an argument later made by counsel in The Osceola. See 189 U.S. at 162.
8 T See, e.g., The Frank & Willie, 45 Fed. 494 (SD. N.Y. 1891). The two doctrines
are interrelated. The duty to provide a safe place to work was violated by failure
to correct dangerous conditions after notice to the employer's agent (vice-principal).
8s Compare The Titan, supra note 86, holding that a seaman not on duty is not
the fellow servant of a pilot engaged in navigation of the ship, with Red River
Line v. Cheatham, supra note 85 to the effect that the seaman and master navigating
the ship are fellow servants.
89 133 U.S. 375 (1890).
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the territorial limits of the state of Wisconsin, which had adopted
a statute that provided in part that every ship, boat, or vessel used
in navigating the waters of that state should be liable "for all dam-
ages arising from injuries done to persons or property by such ship,
boat or vessel," and that the claim for such injuries should constitute
a lien on such ship, boat, or vessel, taking precedence over all other
liens.9 0 The second point of distinction lay in the fact that in The
Osceola the negligence assigned as the cause of the seaman's injury
was that of the master, while in Quebec Steamship Co. it had been
that of a porter and a carpenter. There was a third point of distinc-
tion, of course, that in The Osceola the proceeding had been
brought in the admiralty in rem.
The injured seaman had a decree in the district court and the
claimant appealed. The circuit court of appeals certified three ques-
tions to the Supreme Court:9"
First. Whether the vessel is responsible for injuries hap-
pening to one of the crew by reason of an improvident and
negligent order of the master in respect of the navigation and
management of the vessel.
Second. Whether in the navigation and management of a
vessel, the master of the vessel and the crew are fellow
servants.
Third. Whether as a matter of law the vessel or its owners
are liable to the appellee, Patrick Shea, who was one of the
crew of the vessel, for the injury sustained by him by reason
of the improvident and negligent order of the master of the
vessel in ordering and directing the hoisting of the gangway
at the time and under the circumstances declared; that is to
say, on the assumption that the order so made was improvident
and negligent.
Before answering the first and third questions in the negative and
remanding to the court of appeals (which had reversed the district
court per curiam and dismissed the libel) ,92 Mr. Justice Brown re-
viewed the authorities and wrote his four-proposition primer on
maritime personal injury law as applied to seamen:93
90 2 Wis. STAT. § 3348 (1898); see 189 U.S. at 164.
91 189 U.S. at 160.
92Bottsford v. Shea, 125 Fed. 1000 (7th Cir. 1903).
93 189 U.S. at 175.
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1. That a vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman
falls sick, or is wounded in the service of the ship, to the extent
of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long
as the voyage is continued.
2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and
American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by
seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or
a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances
appurtenant to the ship. Scarff v. Metcalf, 107 N.Y. 211.
3. That all the members of the crew, except perhaps the
master, are, as between themselves, fellow servants, and hence
seamen cannot recover for injuries sustained through the negli-
gence of another member of the crew beyond the expense of
their maintenance and cure.
4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity
for the negligence of the master, or any member of the crew,
but is entitled to maintenance and cure, whether the injuries
were received from negligence or accident.
These four propositions have caused a great deal of puzzlement
among judges and writers. 4 The first is not difficult to understand.
It stated the general duty to provide maintenance and cure and
expressed the contemporary doubt as to its extent. It is clear that
as developed in the English maritime law, maintenance, cure, and
wages were designed to prevent the stranding of a sick sailor in
foreign parts and ceased when he was brought back to England,
that is, at the completion of the voyage.95 There were cases to the
contrary in the lower United States courts,96 however, and Mr.
Justice Brown simply noted the diversity of opinion on the subject.
The second proposition, later to become the cornerstone upon
which the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness to the crew was
to be erected, was an effort to explain the cases cited by the appel-
lees in which recovery had been secured for injuries produced by
negligence.9 7
The third proposition, like the first, was an attempt to state the
settled contemporary law, without expressing an opinion on the un-
decided case. Mr. Justice Brown had noted the diversity of opinion
94See Gi.ioR & BLAcK, Tim LAw oF AnM LTar 248 et seq. (1957) (hereafter
GIIMoRE).
95 See text at notes 186-88 infra.
96 See text at notes 192-94 infra. 97 See text at notes 228--43 infra.
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in Great Britain over whether the master of a ship is a vice-
principal98 and because that question had never been before the
Supreme Court in the United States, he did not treat it as settled.
When the statement is related to Quebec Steamship Co. v. Mer-
chant,9 C. M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Ross,10 and Baltimore & 0. R. Co.
v. Baugh, 0' it is apparent that the vice-principal doctrine and its
precise dimensions was a much agitated question, and it is under-
standable that the Court was not anxious to pass on the point unless
it was raised. But it was the negligence of the master that was
assumed in the questions certified; so if the case was to turn on the
fellow-servant doctrine, the question was raised, and would have
to be decided, which brings us to the fourth proposition.
It is the relationship between the third and fourth propositions
of The Osceola that has occasioned the puzzlement, 10 2 and still
does. 103 If under the "general maritime law" no cause of action
existed against the ship or owner in favor of an injured crew mem-
ber for the negligence of the master or other member of the crew,
why was it necessary to refer to the fellow-servant doctrine at all?
Further, if the maxim respondeat superior did not apply, how could
the master "perhaps" be a vice-principal?
Mr. Justice Henry Billings Brown was an admiralty lawyer of
note and compiler of Brown's Admiralty Reports.10 4 He had writ-
98 As to Scotland, Mr. Justice Brown was in error. Leddy v. Gibson, 11 Ct. Sess.
Cases 304 (3d Ser. 1873), the case he cited, held the opposite of the proposition for
which it was cited.
99 133 U.S. 375 (1890).
100 112 U.S. 377 (1884). 101 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
102 E.g., "It is the law of the sea that vessel owners are liable for wages, mainte-
nance, and expenses of cure of a seaman injured in the service of the ship, except
as a result of his own willful misconduct. There has been gradually added to this
well-defined relation, either by statute or by judicial decisions, an obligation of
the owners to give the seaman indemnity for injuries resulting from unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel or her equipment. The final utterance of the Supreme Court on
the relation of seamen and owners is the case of The Osceola.... It is inconsistent
with many prior and some subsequent cases." The New York, 204 Fed. 764, 765
(2d Cir. 1913).
103 "The third and fourth propositions are repetitious and overlapping and the
third (on the fellow-servant rule) is made unnecessary by the fourth (no recovery
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ten more than his share of the admiralty opinions of the Supreme
Court since his appointment, and no doubt thought that it would
be helpful to the bar to have this whole problem clarified.10 5 It is
difficulty to believe, therefore, that the third proposition was in-
advertent and redundant or contradictory. A review of the argu-
ments made by counsel and the authorities cited suggests that it was
neither.
Counsel for the claimant had argued five propositions relating to
the issue of liability in a proceeding in rem in the admiralty: (1)
there had to be a lien on the vessel; (2) for a lien to exist, there had
to be an underlying liability in personam either at common law or
under the maritime law; (3) in a suit in rem, the underlying liability
had to exist under the maritime law, which the Court had to take as
it found it, unless a lien were given by statute; (4) the Wisconsin
statute was limited to damage done by a ship (e.g., collision) and
created no lien on the ship for personal injuries; (5) the liability
under the maritime law was limited to maintenance and cure. It was
conceded that precedents existed imposing liability on the owner
for negligence of the master, but these cases were distinguished as
having been brought in personam. As a line of retreat, it was argued
that even if the Court were free to decide an in rem case by analogy
to the common law, under Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh,,0 6 it
must draw its analogy from the general law including the fellow-
servant doctrine recognized in the Baugh case, rather than from the
law of Wisconsin, but that in any event the law of Wisconsin
adopted the fellow-servant doctrine.1 07
There seems to be no doubt that the appellants were successful in
getting the Court to view the problem in these terms. Mr. Justice
Brown began by stating:108 "In the view we take of this case we
find it necessary to express an opinion only upon the first and third
questions, which are in substance whether the vessel was liable in
rein.... As this is a libel in rem it is unnecessary to determine
whether the owners would be liable to an action in personam, either
in admiralty or common law, although cases upon this subject are
105 In The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903), handed down the same day, he per-
formed a similar service as to materialmen's liens. See text at notes 115-17 infra.
106 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
107 189 US. at 162-63. 108 Id. at 168.
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not wholly irrelevant." He went on to state, almost verbatim, the
argument of counsel that for liability to exist in a libel in rem, it
must be shown that the liability existed under the general maritime
law, or that a lien existed by virtue of a state statute.
The language employed, "whether the vessel was liable," re-
flected the currency of the doctrine that the liability of a vessel in
rem was independent of the question of liability of its owner. Two
years earlier, in Homer Ramsdell Trans. Co. v. La Compagnie
Ge'nerale Transatlantique,10 9 the Court had held that a shipowner
was not liable at common law for collision damage produced by
the negligence of a compulsory pilot, although under the doctrine
of the offending thing the ship was liable in rem. Although Homer
Ramsdell did not involve liability in personam in admiralty, it plain-
ly suggested that no such liability existed. Atlee v. Packet Co.,110
in which recovery in personam had been allowed, was distinguished
on the ground that "it does not appear that they acted under com-
pulsion in appointing him, and the question of their liability for his
acts was not discussed.""' The Court there cited the observation of
the dissenting Justices in Ralli v. Troop"2 to the effect that the de-
cision in The China"3 that the vessel was liable was made over the
admission that "if the action had been at common law against the
owner, and probably also in personam in admiralty, there could
have been no recovery, as a compulsory pilot is in no sense the agent
or servant of the owner."" 4
The decision in The Osceola was in some ways the reverse of the
coin. In Homer Ramsdell, it was held that where the action is
brought at common law, and, it was suggested, in personam in
admiralty, liability is to be determined in terms of the common law
of agency, that is under the maxim respondeat superior, while the
liability of the ship under the maritime law, resting as it does on the
doctrine of the offending thing, does not carry with it any personal
liability. In The Osceola. reserving the question whether the owner
is personally liable for the negligence of the master under the maxim
respondeat superior, the Court held that under maritime law the
ship is not liable under the doctrine of the offending thing.
109 182 U.S. 406 (1901). 112 157 U.S. 386, 423 (1894).
1o 21 Wal 389 (1874). 113 7 Wal. 53 (1868).
"1x182 U.S. at 416. 114 182 U.S. at 414.
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The decision in The Roanoke,"5 marking over a century of liti-
gation in area of home-port liens, was handed down by Mr. Justice
Brown on the same day that he delivered the opinion in The Osce-
ola. A great man for black-letter law, he delivered himself of three
rules in that case, again after a review of the authorities. They
restated the existence of a lien for necessaries provided in a foreign
port "by the maritime law, as administered in England and in this
country,"' 1 6 the absence of such a lien for such services in the home
port, the remedy in such cases being "in the admiralty.. . in per-
sonam only,""' 7 and the power of the states to create such a lien by
statute in the case of home port transactions. He proceeded to hold
that no power existed to vary by statute the rules regarding mari-
time liens on foreign ships. The result, it will be noted, is exactly the
same as the result in The Osceola. Where a lien existed under the
general maritime law as administered in admiralty courts, it could
be enforced against the ship; where no lien existed, but the cause of
action was maritime under our definitions, it could be brought in
admiralty, but only in personam.
V. AFTERMATH OF THE OSCEOLA
It should be noted that although the doctrine of The China
had the effect of extending the liability of the owners of ships to
negligence beyond their control, the characterization of maritime
personal injuries as governed by the fairly narrow confines of torts
in which a lien could be demonstrated to have existed under the
general maritime law was a protection against the crumbling of
common-law exceptions to the maxim respondeat superior. The
third proposition of The Osceola was therefore greeted with dis-
may, while the fourth was greeted with unrestricted approval. It
seemed to apply the rule expressio unius excIusio alterius to the
Laws of Oleron, leaving the ship liable only in instances in which it
was liable by the maritime law. Since the admiralty sources of the
English law were almost devoid of tort suits against the ship or
owner other than collision cases, recourse to these sources as the sole
measure of liability would practically eliminate them.
This view was expressed in two articles appearing in the Harvard
115 189 U.S. 185 (1903).
117 lcd. at 194.116 Id. at 193.
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Law Review in 1904 and 1906 written by Frederick Cunningham
of the Boston bar. The first" 8 was very short and directed specifi-
cally to the "unfortunate dictum" in The Osceola that the fellow-
servant doctrine has any application in an admiralty court. The
"true and ancient admiralty rule," wrote Mr. Cunningham, was
embodied in the fourth proposition, and the third, "luckily only to
the extent of a dictum as yet," was an "entirely gratuitous" exten-
sion. He stated that the maxim respondeat superior, when properly
applied, "does not have its full force in the admiralty." Until the last
twenty years" 9
no case of a recovery . . . against an employer in personam
for the negligence of another servant in the employ of the
same master, whether coming within the technical definition
of a fellow servant or not, can be found in the reports of
admiralty cases in the United States, and as Judge Addison
Brown says, speaking of seamen: "No authority in the ancient
or modern codes, in the recognized textbooks, or the decisions
on maritime law, can be found allowing such a recovery, and
the absence of any authority holding the owner of the vessel
liable is evidence of the strongest character that no liability
under the maritime law exists." The same words could have
been used at that time with truth of all actions in personam in
admiralty by all servants against the employer for negligence
of other servants as well as actions by seamen.
He went on to point out that the fellow-servant doctrine was de-
veloped to mitigate the hardship of the maxim respondeat superior
in the common law and since the maxim was not employed in ad-
miralty, there was no need for the fellow-servant doctrine.
Now, however, by its dictum in the Osceola case, that the
liability of the ship for an injury to one seaman by the negli-
gence of another does not exist because they are fellow serv-
ants, it implies that unless the servants are fellow servants in
the technical sense of the common law a liability on the part
of the employer does or may exist. Accordingly, we shall
probably see many such cases of servant against employer or
ship, and shall have to determine in each case, as at common
law, whether the servants are in a common employment or
not; for instance, whether a stevedore, longshoreman, cattle-
man, seaman, etc., are in a common employment, whether the
foreman, stevedore, boatswains, mates, master, etc., are vice-
118 Cunningham, supra note 85. 119 Id. at 296.
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principals, and the whole doctrine is fairly launched into the
admiralty law. 20
In his second and longer article in 1906,121 Mr. Cunningham
elaborated his view of the true and ancient admiralty rule. The
liability of the ship proceeded from the doctrine of "the offending
thing," and the liability of the owner in collision cases from the
application of the maxim of the civil law sic utere tuo ut aliendum
non laedas. All other liability in personam he characterized as hing-
ing on privity of the owner to the negligence. He conceded that the
doctrine of "the offending thing" is unfair to the shipowner, but
added that the adoption of the maxim respondeat superior would
not mitigate that unfairness but simply increase the liability in per-
sonam.
In the same volume of the Harvard Law Review an article by
Mr. Fitz-Henry Smith, Jr., also deplored the extension of the mas-
ter-servant doctrine and expressed the hope that the dictum of The
Osceola would be corrected.122 He devoted himself, however, to a
more factual treatment of the cases and an outline of the state of the
law as he saw it. Seamen injured by accident were entitled to no
more than maintenance and cure.23 If they were injured through
negligence, the result was the same. 24 If, however, they were in-
jured through neglect of the owner in failure to discharge some
positive duty owed by the owner to the seaman under his seaman's
contract, he could recover against the ship or owner. This third
class of injuries broke down into injuries produced by defective
rigging or appliances, failure to provide proper provisions or medi-
cines, aggravation of an original injury by failure to provide proper
care, and acts of violence. And in the discharge of these positive
duties Mr. Smith suggested that the master is the alter ego of the
owner, and his failure to discharge them would make the owner
liable. It is interesting to note that this doctrine of agency in the
areas of positive duty, but not in the navigation and management
of the ship, was derived in part from the citation of Scarf v. Met-
120 Ibid.
2l1 Cunningham, Respondeat Superior in Admiralty, 19 Hxv. L. Rnv. 445 (1906).
122 Smith, Liability in the Admiralty for Injuries to Seamen, 19 Hv. L. REV. 418,
422 (1906).
123 Id. at 419. 124 Sd. at 420.
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calf 25 as authority for the second proposition of The Osceola. The
second proposition, it will be remembered, dealt with liability for
failure to provide a seaworthy vessel and to supply and keep in
order proper appliances appurtenant to the ship. Scarff was a com-
mon-law case holding the owner of a ship liable for the negligence
of the master in failing to get an injured sailor to a hospital. There
was an express finding there that the vessel was provided with a
proper medicine chest. "As the action in that case was solely for
improper treatment after injury," wrote Smith, "the conclusion is
reached that the Supreme Court regards a failure to maintain the
appliances of the ship in the same light as a failure to entertain
proper care of a sick or injured seaman, and considers both cases as
instances where an owner is liable for the neglect of the officers of
the ship as the acts of his personal agents in the performance of
positive duties imposed upon him."'126
Both these contemporary commentators, each in his way, demon-
strated considerable prescience. Mr. Smith's reading of the second
proposition was in substance the one adopted by the courts in the
years following the decision in The Osceola,127 though it did not
proceed from so subtle a construction of Mr. Justice Brown's cita-
tion of Scarf v. Metcalf.12 The lower courts simply put the sec-
ond, third, and fourth propositions together and came out with the
result the New York court had arrived at without the help of all of
Mr. Justice Brown's wisdom. When the master is acting in the
125 107 N.Y. 211 (1887).
126 19 HARv. L. REv. at 424.
127 See, e.g., The Troop, 128 Fed. 856 (9th Cir. 1904). In The Troop, and in The
Matterhorn, 128 Fed. 863 (9th Cir. 1904), the Ninth Circuit considered cases of
negligence in provision of medical attention, allowing damages in both cases.
128 In The Troop, note 127 supra, Judge Gilbert made no reference to Scarff.
He did mention, however, that Mr. Justice Brown himself, in the J. F. Card, 43
Fed. 92 (ED. Mich. 1890), had stated that where there was negligence in treatment
the plaintiff could proceed in an ordinary action for negligence. This was a way
of reconciling the statement in The I.F. Card: "Of course, if there be any negligence
or misconduct on the part of the officers of the vessel, this would furnish a separate
ground for action, in which the seaman would recover, not only his expenses for
medical attendance, etc., but compensation for his personal injuries, as in ordinary
cases of negligence," id. at 94, with the fourth proposition of The Osceola. In view
of the manner in which The Osceola was disposed of, it is probable that Mr. Justice
Brown was of the opinion that the owner was liable for the negligence of the officers
in personam at least "as in an ordinary action for negligence."
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navigation and management of the vessel, he is the fellow servant of
the other members of the crew, but where he is acting in the dis-
charge of the positive duites imposed upon the owner to provide
and maintain a seaworthy vessel with adequate appliances, he is
not.
129
Mr. Cunningham's fears were fully realized. The argument that,
because the maxim respondeat superior had no application in ad-
miralty, the ship and owner are not liable to a stevedore injured on
the ship through the negligence of the master or other crew mem-
bers never seems to have been made. Nor does it seem to have been
contended that no lien existed in such cases. The courts proceeded
along straight common-law negligence and master-servant prin-
ciples, and just as Mr. Cunningham warned, they were called
upon to decide from case to case who were fellow servants and who
were not. The typical case was that of the borrowed winchman.
When the ship was turned over to the master stevedore for loading
or unloading, it was usual for the master to provide the stevedore
with a man to operate the steam winch. Sometimes he was paid by
the stevedore, sometimes by the ship, the difference of course being
reflected in the charges made. Where the winchman was negligent
and in consequence one of the longshoremen was injured, the ques-
tion arose whether the former remained an employee of the ship,
making the owner liable under the maxim respondeat superior, or
became an employee of the stevedore, making the injury one pro-
duced by the negligence of the longshoreman's fellow servant.
Either the standard of care employed by these borrowed winchmen
was remarkably low or, because they were the only workmen who
arguably were not fellow servants, there was considerable pressure
to attribute every injury to their carelessness, for such cases abound
in the reports. 30
120 See Carter v. Brown, 212 Fed. 393 (5th Cir. 1914), master and mate held to be
vice-principals of owner in discharging duty to stow cargo properly. Carter v.
Brown was in admiralty in personam. The Osceola was not mentioned. The same
principles, however, were applied in libels in rem. See, e.g., The C. S. Holmes, 209
Fed. 970, 972 (W.D. Wash. 1913).
130 See The Maud, 169 Fed. 487 (SD. Ala. 1909), to the effect that the winchnan
is a fellow servant; The Slingsby, 120 Fed. 748 (2d Cir. 1903), to the effect that he
is not; The Brookby, 165 Fed. 93 (ED. Pa. 1908), where it was held that he was
so incompetent that it was negligent to furnish him.
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In summary, the lower courts used the Supreme Court's answers
to the first and third questions certified in The Osceola as aids in
divining the answer to the second and omitted question. Once they
had worked out that answer, it became unnecessary to ask the first
and third questions again. One result of this mode of procedure was
the disappearance of the distinction between proceedings in rem
and in personam. When the application of the fellow-servant doc-
trine resulted in liability of the owner for the master's negligence,
it could as easily have been said that there was a right to indemnity
under the second proposition of The Osceola.
It should be noted that this view of the law placed the seaman
and any other person injured through negligence on a parity, except
for the seaman's traditional entitlement to maintenance and cure. If
any person lawfully on a ship and not an employee was injured
through the negligence of the master or crew, the owner was liable,
and the proceeding could be brought either in rem or in personam.
This included a passenger, 13 1 a person having legitimate business on
the ship, as one who came on to check on cargo, 32 a stevedore,13 3 a
city inspector, 34 or a visitor. 35 Indeed, he did not have to go on the
ship, for where the master provided equipment for the use of the
stevedores, and a longshoreman was injured as a consequence of its
defective condition, he could recover from the ship or owner where
it was shown that the defective condition was the result of negli-
gence of the ship's company. 36 Where the equipment was not de-
fective when delivered to the stevedore and his employees, how-
ever, but became so during their use of it, the shipowner was not
liable.' 37 Where the longshoreman was injured on the ship through
the negligence of his employer, the master stevedore, as where the
13, The Western States, 159 Fed. 354 (2d Cir. 1908); The Ocracoke, 159 Fed. 552
(ED. Va. 1908).
132 Such a person was permitted to recover as early as 1881. Leathers v. Blessing,
105 U.S. 626 (1881).
133 The General Knox, 180 Fed. 489 (D. RJ. 1910).
134The Steam Dredge No. 161, 122 Fed. 679 (D. Maine 1903), rev'd as to meas-
ure of damages, 134 Fed. 161 (1st Cir. 1904); The Sunbeam, 195 Fed. 468 (2d Cir.
1912).
135 The City of Seattle, 150 Fed. 537 (9th Cir. 1906).
136 Alaska Pacific S.S. Co. v. Egan, 202 Fed. 867 (9th Cir. 1913).
'37 Navigazione Aria Italia of Turin, Italy v. Vale, 221 Fed. 413 (5th Cir. 1915).
[1964
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stevedore provided defective equipment or neglected to discharge
his duty in providing a safe place to work, he was liable in personam
in admiralty, 38 though for some time it had been doubted that the
jurisdiction extended to such proceedings.3 9 The same was true of
the seaman. Where his injury was produced by the servants of the
master stevedore, he could proceed against him in personam,40 and
where he was not within the fellow-servant rule, as where he was
called upon to act outside the course of his employment, 14 or was
injured by the negligence of the crew of another vessel operated by
the same owner,142 he could recover. Where he was injured through
the negligence of a fellow servant, he could not.' 43 Where he was
injured through failure of the master to discharge his duty to keep
the vessel and its appliances in working order, he could recover be-
cause, as we have seen, with respect to these duties the master was
the alter ego of the owner. This was sometimes framed as unsea-
worthiness, but generally as an exception to the fellow-servant rule.
Where the court talked of unseaworthiness, it equated it to the duty
of the master to provide a safe place to work. 44 In this connection
it will be remembered that the second proposition of The Osceola
talked of unseaworthiness of the ship or failure to supply and keep
in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship, the grammar
indicating that the two were separate duties. Quite clearly it was
'
38 Imbrovek v. Hamburg-American Steam Packet Co., 190 Fed. 229 (D. Md.
1911).
130 See id. at 232.
140 Paauhau Sugar Plantation v. Palapala, 127 Fed. 921 (9th Cir. 1904). Here the
usual winchman relationship was reversed. The sailors rowed in for the sugar and
were injured by negligence on the part of the winchman employed by the sugar
plantation.
'41 Cook v. Smith, 187 Fed. 611 (3d Cir. 1911), 17-year-old mess boy injured
while performing duties outside the scope of his employment.
142 This was one of the limitations on the reach of Priestley v. Fowler that oc-
curred to Story when he commented upon the case in 1846: "Suppose two ships,
owned by the same person, and engaged in different voyages, and by a collision be-
tween them, caused by the negligence of the master of one, the master of the other
should receive a grievous injury in his person or property; would he have no
redress against the principal, upon the ground of the maxim, Respondeat Superior?"
SToRY, AmcY 578 (2d ed. 1846).
143 E.g., The Rosalie Mahony, 218 Fed. 695 (W.D. Wash. 1919).
'
44 See Schirm v. Dene Steam Shipping Co., 222 Fed. 587 (E.D. N.Y. 1914).
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thought that the former related only to the permanent structure of
the ship, while the latter covered a variety of ills. 145 It was usually
not necessary to draw the distinction because both were treated
under the ordinary common-law duty of the master to provide a
safe place to work.146
VI. STATUTORY ABROGATION OF THE FELLOW-SER Av T RUL.E
Had the established rules of the common law remained in
vogue, it is probable that we should never have heard of The
Osceola again, and that with the exception of maintenance and cure
and perhaps comparative negligence, no difference would exist today
between sea and land remedies. Even then, however, the strictures
of the common-law defenses to negligence actions in employee in-
jury cases were becoming unpopular. Had this growing concern
over industrial accidents manifested itself in common-law repudia-
tion of Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp., 47 it is prob-
able that seamen's remedies would simply have kept pace with the
new thinking on the subject. This was not, however, the course of
the reform. In 1906, the first federal railroad employers' legislation
was enacted, followed in 1908 by the present Federal Employers
Liability Act.148 These acts abolished the fellow-servant defense in
the railroad industry. Had subsequent legislation been patterned on
these acts, perhaps the common-law defenses would have withered
by judicial decision. But the second federal act was followed in
1910 by the New York Employers Liability Act,140 and workmen's
compensation acts followed in rapid succession.
State decisional law had never afforded any obstacle to uniform
law within the maritime jurisdiction, and the suggestion that it was
obligatory had been expressly repudiated in The Max Morris5 0 and
145 See The I. F. Chapman, 215 Fed. 127 (D. R.I. 1914).
146 There were several cases, however, that separated out the duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel at the commencement of the voyage. See Rainey v. New York &
P. S.S. Co, 216 Fed. 449 (9th Cir. 1914); The Nyack, 199 Fed. 383 (7th Cir. 1912);
The Fullerton, 167 Fed. 1 (9th Cir. 1908); The Drumelton, 158 Fed. 454 (S.D. N.Y.
1907).
147 4 Metc. 49 (Mass. 1842). See text supra at note 72.
148 35 Stat. 65 (1908). The act of 1906 was held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Employers Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
149 N.Y. Laws ch. 674 (1910). 1'0 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
[1964
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Workman v. New York City."51 Indeed, it had not been considered
obligatory in commercial law cases since 1815, and in 1891 the fed-
eral freedom from state-court decision was extended to tort cases. 52
Theoretically state statutes represented no greater difficulty. In
Swift v. TysonI53 the Court had interpreted § 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789154 as referring to state statutes only, and since this sec-
tion made the laws of the several states the rules of decision in the
federal courts only in "trials at common law," state statutory law
was no more of a pariah in the maritime jurisdiction than the state
decisional law. This interpretation of § 34 was adopted in a dictum
by Mr. Chief Justice Story in Brown v. Jones'5 5 in the same year in
which Swift v. Tyson was decided.
This is not to say that state law, both statutory and decisional, did
not often provide guides for the decisions of the federal courts sit-
ting in admiralty. State statutes of limitations had generally been
used by analogy to determine the existence of laches,56 and state
lien statutes had generally been applied unless, as in The Roanoke,157
the Court thought that they were offensive to the general pattern of
rights created by the maritime law. 58 As we have seen, if the Court
had not gone to the state decisions on torts there would have been
precious little tort law to apply. There was a difference, however,
in the mode of application. The decisional law was not applied as
the law of the state, but as an amalgam of state decisions that indi-
cated the character of the "general municipal law" that governed
litigation in admiralty unless it could be shown that the application
of some other rule was required by maritime custom. The state
statute, on the other hand, was applied either according to its terms
or not at all.
It must be conceded that workmen's compensation would be
difficult to assimilate into the law of the admiralty by analogy. In
IM1 179 US. 552 (1900).
152 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 US. 368 (1893).
153 16 Pet. 1 (1842). 154 1 Star. 73 (1789).
155 2 Gall. 477 (C.C. Mass. 1815).
15 6 See Story, J., in The Brig Sarah Ann, 2 Sumner 206, 212 (C.C. Mass. 1835).
162 189 U.S. 185 (1903). See Davis v. A New Brig, Gilp. 473 (ED. Pa. 1834).
1581 bid.
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the first place there was often provision for administrative determi-
nation of the award. In the second place, the systems varied greatly.
Some were dependent upon taxes levied upon the industries
covered.15 9 Some made the remedy exclusive. 160 Some were
voluntary.' 61 They varied also in their coverage and enforce-
ment provisions. The courts were faced, then, with a simple cession
of the maritime law of torts to the states, or rejection of the appli-
cation of these laws to seamen. It was early held that they could not
preclude the seaman's traditional remedies,1 2 and ultimately that
they had no application to members of the crew of a vessel. 63 For a
considerable period, however, they were applied to longshore-
men.
1 64
The advent of the Federal Employers Liability Act of 1908 and
the state compensation laws left the seaman one of a dwindling list
of workmen not compensated for accidents produced by the negli-
gence of their fellow servants. In 1915, this was partially rectified
by the passage of § 20 of the Seamen's Act, which provided:":'
"That in any suit to recover damages for any injury sustained on
board vessel or in its service seamen having command shall not be
held to be fellow servants with those under their authority." This
act in effect settled the doubts expressed in The Osceola as to the
application of the vice-principal rule in admiralty cases, and elimi-
nated the controversy over whether the officer's negligence was in
the performance of a duty owed the seamen by the owner, or in the
ordinary navigation and management of the vessel.
By the time the 1915 provision came to the Supreme Court in
Chelentis v. Lukenbach S.S. Co.,'66 the Court had decided Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen,16 7 holding application of the state workmen's
compensation acts to maritime occupations violative of the general
159 See I LARsoN, WoRKawN's COMvENSATION LAw 38 (1952).
16o Ibid. 161 Ibid.
162 The Fred E. Sander, 208 Fed. 724 (W.D. Wash. 1913).
163 Schuede v. Zenith S.S. Co., 216 Fed. 566 (ND. Ohio 1914).
164 See, e.g., The Bee, 216 Fed. 709 (D. Ore. 1914). In The Bee, the plaintiff was a
longshoreman working on land but struck by a load of lumber being lifted by equip-
ment on the boat. The court applied the Oregon Boat Lien Statute to permit the
action against the vessel.
165 38 Stat. 1185 (1915).
166 247 U. 372 (1918). 167 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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principles of maritime law. In doing so, it had been called upon to
lay particular stress on the existence of a general body of American
maritime law as the source of rights in maritime relationships, and to
emphasize the need for uniformity of treatment within the admiral-
ty and maritime jurisdiction. Chelentis was an action at common
law. It was argued that at common law the right to recover was lim-
ited only by the fellow-servant doctrine, and that the act of 1915
abolished that defense when the negligence was that of a seaman in
command. The Court rejected both these arguments. It held that
the saving-to-suitors clause 6 s preserved only the common-law
remedy for the maritime right. It did not protect rights at common
law. As to the 1915 provision, it was of no application because the
inability of a seaman to recover from the shipowner more than his
maintenance and cure and an indemnity in the event the ship was
unseaworthy stemmed from the fact that the general maritime law
provided him with that and nothing more, not from the fact that
the members of the crew were fellow servants. The Court relied on
Mr. Justice Brown's opinion in The Osceola. It has been written of
Chelentis, "On the 'how to read cases' level, there can be no quarrel
with the Chelentis holding."'619 But Heaven forfend that cases be
read this way. In the district court Judge Manton had directed a
verdict for the defendant on the authority of The Osceola. The
opinion is unreported. In the circuit court of appeals, Judge Ward
wrote a short opinion citing no case but The Osceola.7 0 He noted
that in the third proposition Mr. Justice Brown had left undecided
the question whether the master is a fellow servant of the seaman,
but had decided that the seaman could not recover on the ground of
a negligent order of the master. It followed that whether they were
fellow servants was irrelevant to the case of an improvident order,
and therefore the act of 1915 changed nothing in this respect. This
overlooked the fact that the decision in The Osceola was by its very
terms limited to the existence of a lien, while the four propositions
were designed to canvass the American and English authorities on
the rights of seamen injured in service of the ship. It also overlooked
the decision in Quebec Steamship v. Merchant'7' where the fellow-
servant rule was applied without question at common law in a case
168 1 Stat. 76-77 (1789). 170 243 Fed. 536 (2d Cir. 1917).
169 GmMOmE 281. '71 133 U.S. 375 (1890).
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involving crew members. Indeed if Mr. Justice Brown had meant
that the shipowner was not liable in rem or in personam, in admiral-
ty or at common law, for the negligence of crew members irre-
spective of the fellow-servant relationship, the third proposition
would have been completely inane.
Of interest is the fact that all the Justices who were on the Court
at the time of The Osceola joined the majority; Justices McKenna
and White joined the opinion, and Mr. Justice Holmes concurred in
the judgment. This may have resulted from the posture into which
argument of counsel had put the case, and the implications that the
decision would have for the Court's fast-growing attachment to the
principle of uniformity in seamen's cases. It was argued that com-
mon-law principles applied, and while under the Baugh doctrine
uniformity would be achieved in litigations at common law brought
in the federal courts, characterization of the right as proceeding
from the common law carried with it the possibility of diversity of
interpretation in state court cases under the saving-to-suitors clause.
To protect uniformity the Court felt it necessary to limit the effect
of that provision to confer only a choice of forum and not a choice
of substantive law. To do this it was necessary to characterize the
right as proceeding from the "general maritime law." Overlooked
in the process was the distinction between the law maritime, the
local manifestations of the body of international custom derived
from the ancient codes, on the one hand, and, on the other, the gen-
eral municipal law in maritime matters, having its origin in the deci-
sions of English courts of common law in cases maritime by our
definition. Between The Osceola and Chelentis the distinction be-
tween rights in rem and in personam had been forgotten and the
seaman found that in losing his lien he had lost his rights.
Two years later Congress enacted the Jones Act,172 extending the
provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act to seamen, and in
1927, after an unsuccessful attempt to preserve state workmen's
compensation for longshoremen, 173 the Harbor Workers Compen-
sation Act,174 completed the present-day statutory scheme.
17241 Star. 1007 (1920).
17340 Star. 395 (1919), declared unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 US. 149 (1920), and 42 Star. 634 (1922), declared unconstitutional in
Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
17444 Stat. 866-67 (1927).
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VII. MAINTENANCE AND CuRE: BLUE CROSS PRO HAc VICE
At this point it will be seen that no distinction was drawn
between the seaman and the shoreworker in respect of damages for
injuries occasioned by negligence. Under the first and fourth propo-
sitions of The Osceola, however, the seaman was entitled to main-
tenance and cure in the event he was hurt or became ill in the course
of a voyage. This aspect of traditional maritime law, like the home-
port lien, was subject to litigation in America at a very early date.
Unlike the case of the home-port lien, there was no common-law
authority on the entitlement to, and extent of, maintenance and
cure. All there was to go on was whatever mention of the subject
could be found in the ancient codes and early texts, or "the crooked
line of discretion."'175
The Laws of Oleron contained two provisions, the sixth and the
seventh, respecting the treatment of seamen's ills. The sixth dealt
with seamen who were wounded or hurt in the service of the ship,
and provided that they were to be cured at the charge of the ship.
The seventh dealt with mariners who fell ill. It provided that they
were to be cared for on the ship or, if put ashore, were to have the
same provisions they would have had on the ship and a ship's boy to
look after them. The ship was not required to wait for them, but if
they recovered, they were entitled to their wages for the whole
voyage . 7 These provisions appeared in a number of variations in
the Laws of Wisbuy, 177 the Sea Laws recorded in the Black Book of
the Admiralty,178 the Laws of the Hanse Towns,179 and the Marine
Ordinances of Louis XIV.'8 0 In some places a distinction was made
between being wounded or hurt in the business of the ship and in
the business of the merchant, the latter being charged to the mer-
'
7 5 See Thompson v. The Ship Catharina, 1 Pet. Adm. 104, 111 (1795), on sources
of admiralty doctrine available to early American admiralty judges.
176 The Laws of Oleron, the Laws of Wisbuy, the Laws of the Hanse Towns,
the Sea Laws from the Black Book of the Admiralty, and the Marine Ordinances
of Louis XTV are reproduced in appendixes to Peters' Admiralty Decisions (1807).
Citations to particular articles of these ancient codes will henceforth be cited to their
location in that work. Art. VI appears at 1 Pet. Adm. xiv; Art. VII, id. at xvi.
177 Art. XXXIX, 1 Pet. Adm. cv; Art. XXXV, id. at civ; Art. XLV, id. at cvi.
178 Art. Im, 2 Pet. Adm. lxxxiv.
170 Art. XXXV, 1 Pet. Adm. civ; Art. XXXIX, id. at cv; Art. XLV, id. at cvi.
1So Art. X, XII, 2 Pet. Adm. xxxiii.
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chant, and in some places the expenditures were subject to aver-
age.'' In the Laws of the Hanse Towns it was provided that a mari-
ner disabled in defense of the ship should be taken care of for the
rest of his life.18 2 In the case of sickness, Molloy states that expendi-
tares made by the master on behalf of a mariner were to be de-
ducted from his wages in the event of his recovery and return.8 3
Whether this is the product of a misreading of the Laws of Oleron,
which provide for a deduction only in the case of expenditures over
and beyond the accommodations he would have had on board, 8 4 or
a lessening of solicitude for mariners between the twelfth and six-
teenth centuries, it is impossible to say.' s5 One thing is certain, how-
ever. Since the ship was not bound to wait for him, and no mention
is made of any subsequent payment other than wages for the voy-
181 Art. XXXV of the Laws of the Hanse Towns provided: "The seamen are
obliged to defend the ship against rovers, on pain of losing their wages; and if they
are wounded, they shall be healed and cured at the general charge of [those] con-
cerned in a common average... "' 1 Pet. Adm. civ.
182 Loc. cit. The provision continued: "If any one of them is maimed and disabled,
he shall be maintained as long as he lives by a like average."
183 1 MoLLoy 353-54.
184 ,,... that is to say, so much as he had on shipboard in his health, and nothing
more, . . . unless it be at the mariner's own cost and charges; and if the vessel be
ready for her departure, she ought not to stay for the said sick party-but if he
recover, he ought to have his full wages, deducting only such charges as the master
has been at for him. And if he dies, his wife or next kin shall have it." 1 Pet. Adm.
xvi. Certainly the inference is that "charges as the master has been at for him"
refers to provisions over and above his ordinary fare.
185 There is good authority for supposing that the English law did not provide a
sick sailor with free care of any kind. The Sea Laws, obviously adapted from the
Laws of Oleron, state: ". . . he is to be provided for at the charges of the ship;
and if he be so ill as not fit to travel, he is to be left ashore, and care be taken that
he hath all accommodations of humanity administered to him: and if the ship is
ready for her departure, she is not to stay for him; if he recover, he is to have his
full wages, deducting the master's charges laid out for his account." 2 Per. Adm.
lxxxvi-vii. It will be noted that here there is no mention of charges over and above
his usual fare. See opinion of Edw. Simpson, 12 Feb. 1755, in which the Admiralty
court, apparently referring to the Laws of Oleron (inasmuch as the language "have
been at" is employed rather than "laid out"), was of the opinion that the seaman's
wages were chargeable for all amounts the master has "been at." Mars. Adm. 396
(1885). "And I know of no law received in this country whereby merchant ships
of any burthen are obliged to have an apothecary or surgeon on board, or that
subjects a ship to the charge of curing a sick mariner, unless he be hurt in the serv-
ice of the ship, in which case he is to be taken care of at the ship's expense." Ibid.
E1964
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age, the ship and owners were not obligated to care for him after
the voyage had been continued without him, it being difficult to
believe that it could have been contemplated that enough provisions
be left to carry him through any prolonged illness or disability.
The ancient provisions, therefore, in all probability were adjust-
ments made in consideration of the embarrassing position in which
a mariner found himself when ill in an alien land. He slept, ate, and
worked on board a ship, and when he was sick he could not go
home and be cared for by his family, so provision was made that he
be cared for on board. Where he was too ill to be on board, but was
still a part of the ship's company, arrangements were made to give
him his customary provisions on shore and treat him in the same
way he would have been treated on board, until by necessity he had
to be left behind. If he recovered, he was permitted to sue for wages
contracted for, his breach having been no fault of his own.
Viewed this way, the ancient doctrine of maintenance and cure
was a plain recognition of the fact that a mariner is a shrimp and
not an oyster. It was not a Blue Cross rider on his contract. This
view of the matter ultimately was taken by the English courts. The
question arose in 1854 in Organ v. Brodie,""6 an action for the price
of board, lodging, attendance, and necessaries brought against a
shipowner by the proprietor of a public house. There had been an
accident during the weighing of the anchor, and several seamen
were seriously injured. The master had taken them ashore to the
nearest public house, which happened to be the plaintiff's, and told
the plaintiff that the owner would pay for them. The ship then took
on fresh hands and departed on its voyage. The injured seamen re-
mained at the plaintiff's house for a considerable time, and he
brought an action for their food, lodging, and medicine. The Court
of the Exchequer ruled that the owner was not liable, for there
being no prospect of the mariners continuing on the voyage, the
master had no authority to pledge the owner's credit in their be-
half. There was no discussion of the admiralty doctrine of care for
sick and injured mariners, the case turning on whether the expendi-
ture was for a necessary. The entitlement of a mariner to medical
treatment at the expense of the ship had been the subject of statute
since 1835,187 and between the trial and disposition of Organ .v.
188 10 Exch. 449 (1854). 187 5 & 6 Wm. iv, ch. 19, § xviii (1835).
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Brodie the provisions of the Act of 1835 were substantially re-
enacted as part of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, providing
that the duty to cure mariners who fell sick or were injured in the
service of the ship extended until they were cured, died, or were
returned to England.188
Before the decision in Organ v. Brodie and the passage of the
English Merchant Shipping Act, our law had begun to develop
along different lines. In the earliest reports, the matter was discussed
by Judge Peters in the Pennsylvania district, who reviewed the
ancient codes and concluded that the cure of injured seamen
was to be charged to the ship.189 These notes do not treat of the dif-
ference between injuries at home and abroad, though his introduc-
tory statement in one of them suggests that he thought of the duty
as existing primarily in foreign ports.1 0 He proceeded largely from
a straight reading of the ancient provisions, stating, for instance,
that medical charges, as distinct from nursing, were to be deducted
from the mariner's wages. This he deduced from the fact that the
Laws of Oleron required that the ill seaman put on shore was to
have a ship's boy sent along to take care of him.19' He offered no
opinion on the duration of the duty or at what point it arose. In
Harden 'v. Gordon,'92 in 1823, Mr. Justice Story, sitting in the cir-
cuit court in Maine, held that the duty to provide maintenance and
cure at the charge of the ship extended to sickness as well as acci-
dents in the ship's business. In Story fashion, he reviewed all the
ancient codes, satisfied himself that he knew the contents of the one
he could not find, and found them all unhesitatingly in support of
the owner's duty to provide for sick and injured seamen during the
voyage. And he added that it was a sound doctrine, for seamen go
into strange parts of the world and are peculiarly susceptible to
diseases that abide in such places. So while the Harden case did
away with the distinction between being wounded in the ship's
service and illness through disease, the result was justified on the
188 Eng. MS. Act, 17 & 18 Vict. ch. 104 § 228 (1854).
189 See Scott v. The Brig Greenwich, 1 Pet. Adm. 155, 156 n. (1802); Swift v.
The Ship Happy Return, id. at 253, 255 n. (1799).
190'T"xpenses for boarding on shore, in a foreign port particularly, has been
often brought forward." 1 Pet. Adm. at 255 (1799).
'91 Art. VII, 1 Pet. Adm. xvi. 192 2 Mason 541 (C. C. Maine 1823).
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ground that seamen are free-swimming fish, 93 and on its facts the
case was limited to illness abroad.
Nine years later in Reed v. Canfield,19 4 Mr. Justice Story took the
step which ultimately transformed the duty to provide care abroad
to today's liability for medical treatment and maintenance until
maximum improvement is attained. In the Reed case, the ship had
left New Bedford on a whaling voyage. When it reached New
Bedford on its return, the master went ashore and gave his permis-
sion to one of the mates to go ashore in his absence. Both mates
wanted to go and, taking volunteers from among the crew, rowed
ashore in one of the ship's boats. They had supper, returned to the
boat, and started back to the ship. In the meanwhile the wind had
come up and they were driven away from the ship into the ice-filled
water, where they were stranded until relieved from shore. By this
time they had suffered badly from exposure, the plaintiff having to
have his toes amputated, crippling him for life. Mr. Justice Story
was back at the Laws of Oleron, Wisbuy, and the Hqnse Towns.
These laws provided that the seaman who was wounded in the
service of the ship was to be cured at the expense of the ship, he
held, and it was service of the ship, not the location of the port in
which the seaman was injured, that governed the scope of the duty.
The plaintiff had been under the care of a physician for more than a
year and had required constant medical aid, nursing, diet, and other
assistance. The claim was allowed in full.
It will be noted that in Reed v. Canfield, Mr. Justice Story
treated the case as one of wounding, rather than one of sickness,
mentioning that the Laws of Wisbuy "specificially" stated that if a
mariner goes ashore in the ship's business, and is wounded, he is to
be cured at the ship's charge. In treating the case as a wounding
case, he was able to cite the sixth of the Laws of Oleron, which
speaks of cure,1 5 rather than the seventh, which deals with sickness
and speaks of putting the mariner ashore with a ship's boy and his
usual mess. 96
Betveen Reed v. Canfield and The Osceola, there were several
19 3 Sailors are peculiarly susceptible to diseases to which they are exposed in
strange places.
194 1 Sumn. 195 (C.C. Mass. 1832).
195 1 Pet. Adm. xiv. 196 Id. at xsd.
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opinions in the lower courts that took issue with the broad sweep of
Mr. Justice Story's conception of the ship's duties of care for sick
and injured seamen. Notable among them are Judge Betts's opinions
in 1846 in Nevitt v. Clarke'9' and in 1849 in The Atlantic.'9 8 In
both these cases he took issue with the proposition that maintenance
and cure, arising as it does out of the employment relationship,
could be extended beyond the employment period.
In Nevitt v. Clarke, the plaintiff had become ill during a voyage,
ostensibly from inhaling fumes from a cargo of turpentine, and was
left in the hospital in Valparaiso, where he remained for some five
months. About the time he was released from the hospital the ship
was sold, terminating the contract with the crew. The plaintiff made
his way back to New York. He remained in poor health, was much
of the time "out of employ and at board," and was attended by a
physician at times. Judge Betts held that he was entitled to his wages
until he arrived in New York, and that his right to maintenance
ceased with his entitlement to wages. In The Atlantic, the plaintiff
shipped on a three-year whaling voyage on a lay or share agree-
ment. After seven months at sea, he fell from the maintopsail yard
and was so badly injured that he was taken ashore to the hospital
where he remained for about twenty-one months. On the way
back the ship picked him up and brought him back to New Lon-
don, the home port. Judge Betts held that he was entitled to the ex-
penditures made for his maintenance and cure during the voyage,
but again that they ceased on arrival in New London. Betts took is-
sue with Mr. Justice Story for applying to ordinary sickness and
accidents the rule applied to mariners wounded while fighting for
the ship. He noted the English statutes of 1835 and 1854 and ob-
served that they laid down a clear and practical rule on the subject.
He added, however, that the rule as set out was subject to variation
according to the circumstances, observing: 9 9 "When a course of
medical treatment, necessary and appropriate to the cure of a sea-
man, has been commenced and is in a course of favorable termina-
tion, there would be impressive propriety in holding the ship
chargeable with its completion, at least for a reasonable time after
the voyage is ended or the mariner is at home."
'
9
70Olcott 316 (S.D. N.Y. 1846).
198 1 Abb. Adm. 451 (SD. N.Y. 1849). 199 Id. at 480.
[1964
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These opinions were cited with approval by Judge (later Mr.
Justice) Henry Brown in the Eastern District of Michigan as late as
1890, in an opinion that attributed Reed v. Canfield to "[Mr. Justice
Story's] well-known leaning toward the admiralty courts, and his
belief in the beneficence of their jurisdiction and forms of relief"
which "may have had a certain influence in inducing him to extend
its aids to cases not properly within its purview."200
It was to this course of decision that Mr. Justice Brown referred
in the first proposition of The Osceola, when he added the qualifi-
cation "at least so long as the voyage is continued."' ' By 1916, it
was apparent that Mr. Justice Story's Laws of Oleron were the rule
and Judge Betts's and Mr. Justice Brown's were not,202 and Judge
Learned Hand could say that "cases to the contrary were all de-
cided at a time when general notions of what was just in such mat-
ters favored the libellant much less than at present. Certainly I
should not have the right to change a well-settled rule because it did
not answer present convictions, but when the matter is open and
inclines decidedly towards such convictions, it would be wrong to
twist it back again." 203
VIII. THE DOCTRINE OF UNsEAwoRTHNEss: FROM
CoNTRA1CT TO STATUS
The doctrine of unseaworthiness has its origins in contracts
of marine insurance, and in charter parties. When an owner char-
tered his ship, or applied for insurance on his voyage, it was held that
he warranted to the charterer or insurer that the vessel was "tight,
staunch, and strong." 20 4 This was a very old principle, 05 and at the
time we adopted our Constitution there was a considerable body of
case law on the subject. It can be said with confidence that the duty
to provide a seaworthy vessel was absolute in the sense that want of
2 0 0 The J.F. Card, 43 Fed. 92, 94 (E.D. Mich. 1890).
201 189 U.S. at 175.
202 In fairness to Mr. Justice Story, it must be said that the ancient codes mixed
"hurt" with "wounded," and some of them included special provisions for mariners
wounded in service of the ship.
203 The Bouker No. 2, 231 Fed. 254, 255 (S.D. N.Y. 1916).
204 See PARn, MA~wE INsuRAwtc 221 (9th ed. 1800); ABBOTT 180.
205 See, e.g., Carter v. Boehm, 3 Burr. 1906 (K.B. 1766), opinion by Lord Mansfield.
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scienter did not abrogate the unseaworthiness defense, either in the
case of insurance 206 or the case of a charter party.207 As to the effect
of the knowledge of the charterer or insurer, or previous inspection,
the authorities are vague. It is stated by Park, citing French authori-
ties, that even where the insurer examined the ship before it puts to
sea, the assured warrants its sufficiency to perform the voyage, for
such examinations are only external ("for she is not unripped") and
cannot be expected to apprise the insurer of "interior and latent
defects." This Park considered proper because the master and
owner "cannot be wholly ignorant of the bad state of the ship: but
supposing them to be so, it is the same thing, [they] being indispen-
sably bound to provide a good ship, able to perform the voyage. 208
Abbott quotes Pothier as being of the opinion that in cases in which
there has been an inspection, and the ship found seaworthy, the
shipowner loses his freight but is not liable for damages, but offers a
caveat that if this be so, the inspection should not be an exterior
inspection only.20 9 With this minor qualification, then, it can be
said that the warranty was absolute.
It was not, however, a continuing warranty. Once the ship had
sailed there was no warranty that it would remain seaworthy. As
Lord Mansfield put it in Eden v. Parkinson:210 "She may cease to
be so in twenty-four hours after departure, and yet the underwriter
will remain liable." The reasoning behind the limits on the war-
ranty of seaworthiness is plainly grounded upon the presumption
that the owner in fact knows the condition of his ship at the time it
sails but cannot be supposed to know what happens to it after it has
left. This reasoning was verified by the House of Lords in 1862, in
Gibson v. Small,211 when the question of the existence of such a
206 PARy, op. cit. supra note 204, at 228a. Park cites Lee v. Beach, Sittings at Guild-
hail after Michaelmas Term, 1762, opinion by Lord Mansfield.
207 AB=oT 178.
208 PM, op. cit. supra note 204, at 229.
2 09 ABBOTt 180.
210 2 Doug. 732a (K.B. 1781). Eden v. Parkinson did not deal directly with the
warranty of seaworthiness, but with a warranty of "neutral ship and neutral prop-
erty." War broke out after the policy was contracted for. Lord Mansfield's refer-
ence to unseaworthiness was by way of illustrating the point that warranties warrant
present conditions, not future ones.
2114 H. L. Cas. 353 (1853).
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warranty in time contracts of insurance was first presented to the
court. The question of the existence of the warranty was submitted
to the judges, and although there was s6me difference of opinion
among them, Lord St. Leonards summed up the position of the
majority as against it:212 "In such a policy neither party can be
supposed to know the state of the ship when the risk commenced
and therefore it will be unreasonable to imply a condition of unsea-
worthiness at that period."
The silent term that the ship was seaworthy worked its way from
policies of assurance and charter parties into contracts for the car-
riage of goods in a general ship through the inclusion in the bill of
lading of the exception "perils of the sea."2 13 In the American law it
seems that the continuing duty to keep the vessel seaworthy origi-
nated in such cases and worked its way back into the law of marine
insurance, perhaps by sheer error. In Putnam v. Wood,21 4 decided
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1807, the plain-
tiff gave the defendant shipowner $3,000 to invest in foreign mer-
chandise to be purchased abroad and brought back to this country.
In consideration of the shipowner's purchasing and transporting the
goods, he was to have half the profits. The ship was seaworthy
when it left on the voyage over, but because of bad weather was
leaking when it arrived in Calcutta. It was surveyed and repaired
and then proceeded to load. After it was two-thirds full it began to
leak and took four feet of water in the hold. There was cargo
damage, and the owner, upon the ship's arrival in the United States,
maintained that these losses should come out of the plaintiff's share
of the profits, or at least out of the venture, in which event the
plaintiff would absorb half the loss. The court held that the loss did
not come from "perils of the sea" according to the legal meaning of
the term, that an owner, when he charters a ship, or puts her up for
freight, has a duty to see that she is in suitable condition to transport
her cargo in safety, 215
. and he is to keep her in that condition, unless prevented
by perils of the sea or unavoidable accident. If the goods are
2124 H. L. Cas. 353, 415-16 (1853).
213 See form of bill of lading set out in ABBOTT 174, there spoken of as "old form"
The term used is "the dangers of the seas excepted."
214 3 Mass. 481 (1807). 215 Id. at 484.
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lost by any defect in the vessel, whether latent or visible,
known or unknown, the owner is answerable to the freighter,
upon the principle that he tacitly contracts that his vessel shall
be fit for the use for which he thus employs her. This principle
governs not only in charter-parties and in policies of insurance,
but it is equally applicable in contracts of affreightment.
The statement as to policies was, of course, not only dictum but
probably wrong in terms of precedent. In the 1836 edition of
3 Massachusetts, the statement is starred with the note "A different
rule is applied in the case of insurance," citing the decision of the
King's Bench in Holdworth v. Wise21 6 in 1828. In 1831, in Pad-
dock v. Franklin Insurance Co.,21 7 Mr. Chief Justice Shaw of the
same court noted that it was ridiculous to suppose that the assured
warranted to keep the ship seaworthy, for that was the precise risk
against which he insured. The compromise he drew in these cases
was to the effect that the ship must be seaworthy when it leaves on
the voyage, and after that if it becomes unseaworthy, the owner has
a duty to repair it and make it seaworthy if it is within his power to
do so. Since the warranty imposed in Putnam v. Wood attached
only to seaworthiness when departing from ports on the voyage,
this amounts no doubt to the same thing. Thus at the time of Gib-
son v. Small it was recognized that the English and American rules
differed on this subject.
The first application of the seaworthiness doctrine to seamen's
articles seems to have come in early cases dealing with non-per-
formance of duties, and the consequent refusal to pay wages. The
first of these was Dixon v. Ship Cyrus,218 before Judge Peters in the
District of Pennsylvania. The vessel was bound for Lisbon from
Philadelphia. As she came a few miles down the river the mariners
discovered that the rigging was insufficient and remonstrated with
the captain, finally refusing to proceed until the defect was cor-
rected. The captain sent word to the owners, one of whom went to
the ship and talked with the mariners. He promised that no issue
would be made of their behavior, and the ship sailed, the deficiency
being made up by reweaving some old ropes. When the ship arrived
in Philadelphia the crew went ashore, and when they returned they
218 7 B. & C. 794 (Q.B. 1828).
217 28 Mass. 226 (1831). 218 2 Pet. Adm. 407 (1789).
HeinOnline  -- 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 298 1964
FLOOD TIDE 299
found that day laborers were unloading the vessel. They stayed
around but found that there were no provisions for feeding them
("that the kettle was cold") and at length considered that they had
been discharged from the ship's service. The owner refused to pay
them their wages. Judge Peters observed: 219
* . . not withstanding this silence of the articles, law and
reason will imply sundry engagements of the captain to the
mariners.... first, that at the commencement of a voyage, the
ship shall be furnished with all the necessary and customary
requisites for navigation, or, as the term is, shall be found
seaworthy; and, secondly, that the captain shall supply the
mariners with good and sufficient provisions whilst they are
in his service.
The question of suing the employer for damages, of course, was
not involved. Since in 1837, Lord Abinger took Priestley v. Fowler
as novel, this comes as no surprise. Nowhere were there precedents
for personal injury negligence actions by employees against em-
ployers.
It must be remembered that although Priestley v. Forwler is con-
sidered the ancestor of the fellow-servant rule, the case was one of
servant against master for the failure of a van provided by the
master. It was held that the relationship between master and servant
did not create a duty to see that the van was "landworthy." In
1854, in Couch v. Stee 220 the English courts were faced with the
question whether the shipowner had such a duty to the mariner. In
that case the plaintiff's counsel contended that the warranty of sea-
worthiness created the duty absent in Priestley v. Fowler, and
therefore the action would lie. The plaintiff had signed articles and
gone on the voyage and completed it. During the voyage he became
ill, allegedly through the unseaworthiness of the ship, in that he
was forced to sleep in wet quarters. He also contended that his con-
dition was made worse through want of a proper medicine chest
required by statute.
In separate opinions, Lords Campbell, Coleridge, and Wightman
were all of the opinion that the case was governed by Priestley v.
Fowler. Conceding language in Gibson v. Small stating the war-
ranty to the insurer, they were of the opinion that like many other
220 3 E. & B. 402 (Q3. 1854).210 Id. at 411.
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points of insurance law, it had no bearing on the case. Further, Lord
Campbell saw quite clearly the direction a decision the other way
could lead. "There being no allegation of a scienter," he wrote, "if
we held the defendant liable on this count, we must hold a ship-
owner always liable to an action from every seaman, if, from any
accident, a butt having started or the like, the ship was not sea-
worthy. 221 There was no discussion of the question of continuing
duty. In the first place the implied warranty in the insurance policy
was not continuing. In the second place, the allegation in Couch v.
Steel was to the effect that the ship was unseaworthy at the start of
the voyage.
Counsel for the plaintiff were not unaware of the American
cases, and in argument on the existence of the duty observed that
the American law seems to take the duty for granted, citing Maude
and Pollock.222 In 1854, then, the English court was aware both of
the seeds sown by the early American judicial language of unsea-
worthiness and of precisely the direction in which it would or might
lead.
In 1862, however, in Turner v. Owen,223 Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn presided at nisi prius over a case almost exactly like
Dixon v. Ship Cyrus, and stated to the jury, "on the other hand,
when he signs articles it is implied, on the part of the owner, that
the ship shall be reasonably fit for navigation, i.e., shall be sea-
worthy."224 No mention was made of Couch v. Steel or of other
cases. Presumably the Queen's Bench thought the problem of a
warranty defense to a contract a different problem from a warranty
of the ship's condition as a predicate for an action for damages.
If Maude and Pollock took the duty for granted, Professor The-
ophilus Parsons225 stated it categorically in his work on Shipping
Law in 1869. In commenting on Couch v. Steel, he stated:226 "This
decision is clearly repugnant to the principles of the American au-
22 1 ld. at 407.
22 21d. at 406 (1854). The reference was to MAuDE & PoLLocx's COMPENDIU OF
Thm LAw OF MERCHANT SHPING 87, n. (i) (1853).
223 3 F. & F. 176 (Q.B. 1862). 224 ld. at 179.
225 The son of Judge Theophilus Parsons, who was on the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts at the time of the decision in Putnam v. Wood.
2262 PARSONS 78.
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thorities ... , independent of statute provisions." He cited Dixon v.
Ship Cyrus and several other cases with similar facts.22
By the time of The Osceola, there were many cases in which the
mariner had been permitted to recover damages for injuries pro-
duced by dangerous conditions on shipboard. Most of these cases
were decided without reference to the doctrine of warranty of sea-
worthiness. Indeed it is clear that that doctrine was considered
much more limited than the principle to be applied in personal
injury cases. This can be seen from a comparison of the four opin-
ions by Judge Addison Brown cited by Mr. Justice Henry Brown
in The Osceola. In The City of Alexandria,2 8 in 1883, there was a
death on board during the voyage and the chief cook was sent be-
low to assist in packing the body in ice. He fell through an open
hatch between decks and brought his libel on the ground of negli-
gence of the officers in leaving the hatch open and failure to warn
him of the fact. Judge Brown held that under the municipal law the
negligence was fellow-servant negligence, but that since the libel
was brought in the admiralty in rem, a right must be shown under
the general maritime law. Under that law, he went on, there was no
authority for recovery for the negligence of the ship's company. In
The Edith Godden,2 29 two years later, the boom of a derrick used
in connection with a steam winch fell on the libelant because an
iron hook broke. Inspection showed that there was no latent defect
or apparent insufficiency. Judge Brown found that the cause of the
breaking was the insufficiency of the equipment to sustain the
weights it had to lift in a rolling sea. The City of Alexandria was
different, he observed, because there the sufficiency of the equip-
ment was assumed. He did not rest the result on unseaworthiness,
however, but on the municipal law. Steam winches were new things
and therefore the case should be decided by analogy to the munic-
ipal law of master and servant. Under the municipal law, the master
was under a duty to exercise due care to provide machinery ade-
quate and proper for the use to which it was applied, and to main-
tain it in like condition. In The Frank and Willie,20 a cargo of
227 The Ship Moslem, Olcott 289 (SI). N.Y. 1846); Hindman v. Shaw, 2 Pet. Adm.
264 (1806).
228 17 Fed. 390 (SD. N.Y. 1883).
229 23 Fed. 43 (SD. N.Y. 1885). 230 45 Fed. 494 (S.D. N.Y. 1891).
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lumber was stacked in tiers seven feet high, nearly perpendicular,
and not fastened together by ties. The tiers became shaky and
repeated expostulations were made to the mate against discharging
in this manner without leaving proper support at the bottom for the
high tiers above, to prevent their falling. They fell and injured the
libelant. Judge Brown noted cases pro and con on the subject of
mere negligence of the officers, but stated:231 "The principle in-
volved, viz., the duty to provide reasonable security against danger
to life and limb, by at least the usual methods, when these dangers
are brought home to the knowledge of the proper officers, is mani-
festly a general one. It attends the seaman wherever he is required to
go on shipboard in the performance of his duties, and applies as
much to a dangerous condition of the cargo as to defective rigging
or a rotten spar." He concluded that "I do not hold the ship liable
for the mate's mere negligence as a fellow-workman in producing
the dangerous situation, but for his refusal to remedy it when com-
plaint was made, and the danger pointed out to him. '2 32
In The Julia Fowler233 the libelant fell while working on a tri-
angular framework of wood rigged up by the mate of the vessel. It
was rigged so that one side was held by the end of a halliard alleged
to be known to be unfit for the purpose. The mate had ordered the
use of the particular rope and had supervised the rigging of it. The
injured mariner had nothing to do with either. The master was sick
below. The court held that the mate was not acting in the mere
capacity of a fellow servant. The case was, wrote Judge Brown,
substantially the same as The A. Heaton.234
Though these cases represent a development of a duty of care to
see that safe working conditions are provided, patterned after if not
taken directly from the municipal law of master and servant, insofar
as they apply to conditions which take place after the ship sails on
the voyage, it is apparent that they are no different from the doc-
trine of seaworthiness as it had developed under the American cases.
None of them was predicated upon unseaworthiness at the time the
voyage commenced. In The A. Heaton,235 however, decided on
231 Id. at 496. 232 Ibid.
233 49 Fed. 277 (S.D. N.Y. 1892).
234 Id. at 278. See text infra, at note 235.
235 43 Fed. 592 (D. Mass. 1890).
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circuit in 1890 by Mr. Justice Gray, the injury was occasioned by
failure of a gasket. The question of unseaworthiness was considered
and rejected because there was no evidence that the ship put to sea
in an unseaworthy condition. The gasket in question was a device
that required frequent replacement. During the voyage it had been
inspected and the poor condition had been reported to the master
who replied "that it lasted the last voyage and he thought it would
do this, and that he did not intend to spend much on it, but run it
as cheap as he could, because on his return to the United States he
would be off, and the ship sold." 236 Citing Leathers v. Blessing,237
and other third-party tort cases in admiralty,28 Mr. Justice Gray
came to the conclusion that actions for negligence were cognizable
in admiralty, and that a lien existed for personal injury in America,
though it was doubtful in England. He went on to set aside the
question of fellow-servant negligence by reference to C. M. & St.
P. R. Co. v. Ross,2 39 and the observation that "No reason can be
assigned why the owners of a vessel should be held less liable to a
seaman for the negligence of the master in a court of admiralty than
in a court of common law."240 Again, The A. Heaton was decided
on general principles of common law applied by analogy in admiral-
ty, and not on the ground of unseaworthiness, but again it would
have made no difference if the matter had been approached through
the early unseaworthiness cases dealing with affreightment, for
there was an unseaworthy condition developing after the vessel put
to sea, notice of the condition to the proper officers, and oppor-
tunity to correct it, and in this case a wilful refusal to do so.
The only case cited by Mr. Justice Brown in The Osceola in
which the holding was actually predicated upon unseaworthiness
was The Noddleburn2 1 decided by Judge Deady in the District of
Oregon in 1886. There the libelant was injured when the seizing on
a crane-line broke. Shortly before the accident the mate had sent a
man to repair the seizing and the master asked the mate what he was
doing. The mate told him and the master put the man to other
236 Id. at 594. 237 105 U.S. 626 (1881).
238 Including The Harrisburg, 119 US. 199 (1886), which, he stated, had been
overruled only on the issue of abatement by death.
239 112 U.S. 377 (1884).
240 43 Fed. at 595. 24128 Fed. 855 (D. Ore. 1886).
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tasks, accusing the mate in obscene and filthy terms of trying to
curry favor with the men by assigning easy tasks. Judge Deady
noted the decision in Couch v. Steel, observed that it was decided
on authority of Priestley v. Fouler, noted further that the doctrine
of the later case had been modified by Ross and other American
cases at common law, and cited Parsons' suggestion that the case
was not reconcilable with the American authorities. But even if the
Couch case were accepted as the law, he went on, it was not in
point because in The Noddleburn "there was actual knowledge on
the part of both the master and the mate of the unsound and un-
seaworthy condition of the vessel in the particular of this rope,
coupled not only with willful negligence, but wanton indifference,
on the part of the former. It is admitted that the master stands for
and represents the owner while in charge of the vessel, and, in my
judgment, the mate, when not in the immediate presence of the
former, does also. '242
It is clear that the duty of the master, at least, to use due care in
avoiding injury to the crew was looked upon as broader than the
duty to use due care to maintain seaworthiness, for in The Titan24
the injury was the result of a collision. There was no unseaworthy
condition alleged, either at the time of sailing or after, for the col-
lision was the product of negligent navigation by the pilot. The
Titan was decided flatly on the authority of Ross to the effect that
the pilot was not engaged in the same employment with the mari-
ner. The libelant was a deck hand on board but not on duty at the
time.
In reconciling these cases in The Osceola, Mr. Justice Brown was
able to characterize all but The Titan as unseaworthiness cases. He
disposed of The Titan by observing that the general question of
liability was not discussed. This, as has been seen, is not quite
accurate, but it is true that the discussion was short and did not cite
any of the admiralty cases. On the very facts of the two cases, The
Osceola is inconsistent with The Titan, and the latter can be taken
as disapproved.
In 1876 England modified by statute244 the rule in Couch v.
242 28 Fed. at 858.
243 The Titan, 23 Fed. 413 (S.D. N.Y. 1885).
2 4 4 Eng. M.S. Act § 7, 34 & 35 Vict. ch. 110 (1871).
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Steel. The statute provided that in every contract of service there
should be implied an obligation of the owner, that he, the master,
and the agent charged with the loading and preparation for sending
her to sea, should use all reasonable means to insure the seaworthi-
ness of the ship for the voyage. It added the qualification that the
owner should not be subjected to liability for sending out an un-
seaworthy vessel where his act was reasonable and justifiable. The
English law, as stated in the statute, and the American law as it had
developed in the cases prior to The Osceola, were substantially the
same, at least as applied to conditions arising after the commence-
ment of the voyage. It should be remembered that in The Osceola,
the doctrine was spoken of as settled law, in England and America,
the statute of 1876 was mentioned as the source of this departure
from the ancient codes, and the American equivalent as being a
consensus among the circuit and district courts. "We are not dis-
posed to disturb so wholesome a doctrine," wrote Mr. Justice
Brown, "by any contrary decision of our own."24 5 In view of the
source to which it is attributed, and the cases cited in its support,
it must be that Mr. Justice Brown viewed the duty to guard against
subsequent unseaworthiness as that established in lower court cases,
that is to say, a duty of care, not a warranty of the condition of
the ship.
During this period, there was no authority on the duty to provide
a seaworthy ship at the outset, as applied to personal injuries to
seamen. The precise point did not come before the Supreme Court
until 1922 in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger.246 The Sandanger
case was a common-law action for negligence for injuries produced
by an explosion on a launch. The negligence alleged was in sending
the plaintiff out in a boat on which there was a can marked coal
oil that contained gasoline and in not providing the boat with life
preservers. The coal oil was to be used in starting fires in a small
stove on the boat. The state court had given instructions on com-
mon-law negligence, including contributory negligence, but the
jury had returned a verdict anyway. The case came to the Supreme
Court on certiorari on the sole point of error in giving the common-
law instructions. Mr. Justice McReynolds held the error harmless,
245 189 U.S. at 175.
246 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
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because, he wrote,247 "we think the trial court might have told the
jury that without regard to negligence the vessel was unseaworthy
when she left the dock if the can marked 'coal oil' contained gaso-
line; also that she was unseaworthy if no life preservers were then
on board; and that if thus unseaworthy and one of the crew received
damage as a direct result thereof, he was entitled to recover com-
pensatory damages." He cited two cases, The Sylvia248 and The
Southwark.2 9 These two cases were both cases under the Harter
Act in which the Court had said that the act did not excuse the
shipowner from beginning the voyage with a seaworthy ship. In
The Sylvia it was held that where the ship left with ports open that
could be closed at any time, failure to close them did not make the
ship unseaworthy but constituted simple negligence. In The South-
.wark it was held that a ship in the beef trade was unseaworthy
when it had insufficient refrigeration equipment at the start of the
voyage.
The Sandanger case, then, applied to seamen's injuries the war-
ranty of the shipowner to furnish a seaworthy vessel at the outset
of the voyage, and rounded out the unseaworthiness doctrine as
developed in the early affreightment cases, said by Parsons to apply
to seamen's articles. There was an absolute duty to provide a sea-
worthy vessel, and a duty to correct a later unseaworthy condition
where there was notice of it and an opportunity to do so.
In Plamals v. S.S. Pinar del Rio, 25 six years later, it became ap-
parent that in recognizing the absolute duty to provide a seaworthy
vessel at the start of the voyage, the Court had abandoned the sec-
ond part of the American variety of warranty of seaworthiness,
the duty to employ care to keep it seaworthy. In Pinar del Rio,
the libelant was injured when a boatswain's chair fell because of
defective rope. The mate had selected the rope and supervised the
rigging of the chair. There was a testimony to the effect that the
seaman refused to go up in the chair because of the condition of
the rope, but was ordered to go, and did. It is surprising that the
case was brought in admiralty, inasmuch as there was obvious neg-
ligence and the cause of action arose after the passage of the Jones
Act. The libelant was a Spanish subject injured on an English ship,
247Id. at 159. 249 191 U.S. 1, 8 (1903).
[1964
248 171 Lv.S. 462, 464 (1898). 250 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
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however, and perhaps because of the assumption of the day that the
Jones Act required an election of remedies, and the doubt as to its
application to one so situated, he proceeded against the ship in rem.
The Court held that the Jones Act was not to be applied in a libel
in rem. Mr. Justice McReynolds devoted three lines to the subject
of unseaworthiness, observing simply that the record did not sup-
port the suggestion that the ship was unseaworthy because the mate
selected a bad rope when good ones were available. 51 This was
flatly contrary to the holding in Olson v. Flavel 52 and unless The
Julia Fowler253 is distinguished on the ground that the master was
sick, flatly contradictory to the holding in that case. It also contra-
dicted the holding in The Frank and Willie.254 When it is remem-
bered that all these cases were cited by Mr. Justice Brown in The
Osceola as being a consensus of American lower court cases estab-
lishing a doctrine the Court thought "so wholesome" that it was
not disposed to disturb it, it will be seen that Pinar del Rio repre-
sented a sharp restriction of the duties formerly supposed to exist
on the part of the owner to provide safe appliances, whatever the
label placed upon it.
But history was to repeat itself. When Mr. Justice McReynolds
wrote the opinion stripping the seaman of his in personam rights
to an action for negligence governed by the common law as ex-
panded by § 20 of the Merchant Seaman's Act of 1915,255 they were
restored with a dividend in the Jones Act.256 His halving of the
unseaworthiness doctrine in Pinar del Rio was to be restored with
a dividend in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.257 in 1943.
The Mahnich case was what is known as a "widow" case. The
plaintiff was a seaman injured under almost exactly the same cir-
cumstances as those in Pinar del Rio. He fell from a staging because
of the breaking of a rope selected by the mate. As in that case, there
was good rope available. Under the Jones Act there was no doubt
of a cause of action. This time the libelant did not bring his action
under the statute because he had let the period of limitations expire
while he hoped for some sort of voluntary settlement of the claim.
251 Id. at 155.
25234 Fed. 477 (D. Ore. 1888). 255 38 Stat. 1164 (1915).
253 49 Fed. 277 (S.D. N.Y. 1892). 25641 Stat. 1007 (1920).
254 45 Fed. 494 (S.D. N.Y. 1891). 257 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
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After a most disingenuous review of authorities, Mr. Justice Stone
held that the duty to provide seaworthy appliances is absolute and
independent of negligence, so a fortiori the existence of negligence
does not result in a bar to recovery for unseaworthiness. He began
with a statement, true so far as it goes, that since The Osceola it
had been the settled law that the vessel and the owner are liable
to indemnify a seaman for injury caused by the unseaworthiness of
the vessel or its appurtenant appliances and equipment. Then he
stated that in "a number of cases in the federal courts ' 25 8 prior to
The Osceola, the right seems to have been rested on negligence,
but that in later cases both the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts "have followed the ruling of The Osceola,... that the exer-
cise of due diligence does not relieve the owner of his obligation
to the seaman to furnish adequate appliances." 25 9
Of course there was no such ruling in The Osceola. It must be
conceded, however, that the Sandanger case could be looked upon
as reading into the seaman's contract a warranty of the seaworthi-
ness of the vessel when it begins the voyage. Here, however, the
condition alleged to be unseaworthy was the product of negligent
behavior at sea. As it was pointed out in the discussion of Pinar del
Rio, there was ample authority for the holding that at least when
the defective condition was within the knowledge of the officers
of the ship, the owner was liable for such negligence under the
customary limits of the American version of the warranty of sea-
worthiness. Mr. Justice Stone, however, proceeded on other
grounds. Instead of holding that there was liability because the sub-
sequent unseaworthiness was the product of negligence, he held that
it produced liability independent of negligence. The cases he cited
did not in any way support the holding. As we have seen, the San-
danger case dealt with unseaworthiness "when she left the dock. '260
The Arizona v. Anelich261 held only that assumption of risk was not
a defense in a case brought under the Jones Act. The case came to
the Court on a finding of negligence. Beadle ,v. Spencer262 was to
the same effect, there being a finding that lumber was negligently
stacked on deck and fell over because of its instability, precisely
258 Including The Noddleburn and The Julia Fowler.
259 321 U.S. at 100. 261298 U.S. 110 (1936).
260 259 U.S. at 259. 262 298 U.S. 124 (1936).
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the facts of The Frank and Willie. In Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v.
Smith26 3 there was a finding that the petitioner knew of the defec-
tive condition of the step that was found to be defective. The only
two cases cited which dealt in any way with the absolute duty to
provide a seaworthy vessel were The H. A. Scandrett2 64 and The
Edwin I. Morrison.265 The H. A. Scandrett was a libel for personal
injuries brought by a seaman who fell backward into an open hatch
when the knob pulled off a door leading to seamen's quarters. There
was a special verdict of the jury to the effect that:21. "The
respondent failed in its duty to furnish libelant a vessel on this
voyage which commenced at Duluth on November 12, 1933, in a
seaworthy condition." The court held, in an opinion by Judge
Augustus Hand, that the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel at the
start of the voyage was absolute. The Edwin I. Morrison was a
libel arising out of an alleged breach of a charter party. A cargo
of guano had been damaged by water that came through a bilge-
pump hole when the cap, which had not been inspected in eleven
years, came off during rough weather. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller
stated the normal American rule on the warranty of seaworthi-
ness: 26 7 "Perils of the sea were excepted by the charter party, but
the burden of proof was on the respondents to show that the vessel
was in good condition and suitable for the voyage at its inception,
and the exception did not exonerate them from liability for loss or
damage from one of those perils to which their negligence, or that
of their servants, contributed." Mr. Justice Stone noted that the
Harter Act had substituted "due diligence" for the absolute duty
to provide a seaworthy vessel, but no such change had been made
in the maritime law of personal injuries.
The story of how the absolute duty created in Mahnich was
verified and extended to longshoremen has been told frequently.
In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki268 in 1944, in an opinion by Mr.
263 305 US. 424, 427 (1939): "We must accept the verdict as establishing ... that
[plaintiff] knew that it was defective at the time of the accident, for the only
evidence of any breach of duty by petitioner was respondents testimony that
he knew of the defect and had reported it to the first assistant engineer two or
three weeks before the accident."
204 87 F. 2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).
265 153 U.S. 199 (1894). 267 153 US. at 211. (Emphasis added.)
266 87 F. 2d at 709. 265 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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Justice Rutledge, the Court found that in early times mariners un-
loaded ships, but in later times independent contractors did this
work. The purpose of the warranty of seaworthiness being de-
signed to protect workers doing seamen's work, it should be applied
to these "substitute seamen." This piece of history has been ques-
tioned in a number of places,269 though it has recently been recog-
nized that Supreme Court historical premises, unlike those of mere
historians, are good until overruled.270 It is fair to say, however, for
what it is worth, mariners did load and unload ships. The fifth
article of the Laws of Wisbuy provides for extra pay for "guidage
or hoisting."271 The Laws of the Hanse Towns suggest that some-
times they did not, for the fifty-first article provided that the
master ought to put a mariner in each boat or lighter that is to carry
salt to land, "as to see that a right account is kept of its measure,"
indicating that in the salt trade others unloaded the cargo; the
twenty-seventh speaks of the merchants being bound to load the
ship by a pre-fixed time.272
There is an extended discussion of the question in S'winney v.
Tinker,273 decided by the High Court of Admiralty in 1774, just
two years before the American Revolution. There the master re-
fused to pay the mariners' wages because they refused to "unliver"
potatoes in London harbor. Evidence was introduced on both sides
as to the custom of the particular trade. There is another extended
discussion in Swift v. The Ship Happy Return7 4 in the District
of Pennsylvania in 1799. As in Swinney v. Tinker, it was relegated
to local custom. Judge Peters observed that by that time, in any
event, most of the refusals to pay wages did not occur because the
mariners refused to unload after bona fide efforts to make them
unload, but "when old quarrels at sea, or recent animosities, or
differences about accounts, have embittered the parties.2 75
What is remarkable about the Supreme Court's history is not,
then, the accuracy of its research, but the conclusion that proceeds
269 See, e.g., Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers,
39 CoRNELL L. Q. 381 (1954).
27oForklfn v. Furness Withy & Co., 323 F. 2d 638, 641 (2d Cir. 1963).
271 1 Pet. Adm. Ixx.
272 Id. at xcix, cviii. 274 1 Pet. Adm. 253 (D. Pa. 1799).
273 Mars. Adm. 139 (1774). 275 Id. at 255.
HeinOnline  -- 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 310 1964
FLOOD TIDE 311
from what it found. It is obvious that in 1799 there was no prece-
dent for a personal injury action predicated upon the negligence
of the master or crew or upon any warranty of seaworthiness.
Indeed, there was no common-law action for negligence of the
master. Whatever different treatment the mariner received in the
courts (i.e., maintenance and cure), he received only because he
was a shrimp. The oyster, seaman or longshoreman, proceeded at
common law. So even if he did unload the cargo, it was not for that
reason that he was treated as he was.
IX. Tm REmAiNiNG WAms AND THE KiNDLY GUAiL T
From very early times one finds reference to the special
solicitude with which the admiralty looks after the rights of sea-
men.1 6 They are generally regarded "by the nature of their em-
ployment, [as] subject to peculiar failings and vices, the offspring
of unpolished manners, and hearty, rude and fearless habits...., 7
For this reason, wrote Judge Peters in 1806, the maritime law was
designed partially to reform them (through heavy fines and mulcts,
and corporal inflictions), but where the harshness of this treatment
can be balanced by indulgences and encouragements, he suggested
that these were ever enjoined.78 Cases in which these "wards of
the admiralty" statements appeared were typically ones in which
the master or shipowner was trying to get out of paying the seaman
his wages because of some alleged misbehavior during the voyage
or fine-print provision to which the seaman, illiterate in all prob-
ability, had affixed his mark. But while the courts were indulgent
in overlooking faults that might deprive the seaman of wages for
backbrealdng labor, and assiduous in protecting his established
rights, it must be conceded that seamen under the "general maritime
law" were no favored class. Their wages were dependent upon the
earning of freight, and three years' wages could be lost in an hour
when the ship went down. 79 They were called upon to defend the
276 See, e.g., Dr. Wynne for the petitioners in Swinney: "But that is not the case
in an agreement between mariners and masters of ships. The former are very in-
attentive and ignorant, and are always considered by the Court as pupils, and guards
them against being drawn into what is not contained in the contract." Mars. Adm.
at 142.
277 See J. Watson v. The Brig Rose, 1 Pet. Adm. 132, 137 (1806).
278 Ibid. 279 1 MoLLoY 357.
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ship and its cargo at the risk of their lives2 0 and were jointly re-
sponsible for theft or embezzlement.2 8' They could be beaten, put
in irons, or if they deserted, hanged.282
The indulgences and encouragements of which Judge Peters
spoke were generally of two types. One was the equitable construc-
tion of contracts. Because seamen were an ignorant lot, and would
sign anything, the courts were reluctant to hold them to oppressive
bargains. Because they were subject to a great variety of fines and
mulcts, the courts were watchful lest the owners and masters em-
ploy fines to get their labor for nothing. The other arose from
special circumstances arising from the peculiar nature of their
employment. They signed on for the voyage, lived and worked on
the ship, were paid at irregular intervals, and were under the dom-
ination of the ship's officers. The master was therefore considered
a sort of pater familias, dispensing punishment but with a duty to
care for the persons put under his charge.
Our early decision to mark off as maritime everything that oc-
curred on navigable waters, rather than occurrences on the high
seas, ipso facto introduced anomalies into the system. Thus when
Fred Jones fell ill aboard "The Bouker No. 2," he got off and took
the suburban train to Plainfield where he lived with his wife. His
calling required no longer absences from home than a neighboring
drummer. He went to the Plainfield hospital and not to the marine
hospital because neither he nor his employer ever thought of the
marine hospital. His employers were contractors by trade, engaged
in garbage disposal. Jones had only recently taken the job on the
tug and at the time of the action was driving a bus.283 Once the
special circumstances of the seaman disappeared, many of them
working under the same conditions as other workers, all that was
left to sustain the concept of "the ward of the admiralty" was a
general eleemosynary itch. This is a distemper to which the Fuller
Court was not particularly subject. Mr. Justice Brown had joined
280 They lost their wages for neglecting to assist the master in defending the ship
against attack by pirates. See ABBoTr 374.
281 See Sullivan v. Nathaniel Ingraham, Bee 182 (D. S.C. 1802).
282 See Thorne v. White, 1 Pet. Adm. 168 (1806).
283See The Bouker No. 2, 241 Fed. 831 (2d Cir. 1917), cert. den. 245 U.S. 647
(1917).
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in the opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer in Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v.
Baugh, 2 4 and in The 1. F. Card285 had taken issue with the exten-
sion of the special seaman's right to maintenance and cure to cover
medical treatment at home. Brewer was still on the Court. Mr.
Justice Holmes's views on respondeat superior are well known,288
and from his opinion in Kalleck v. Deering,2 7 we know that he
was of the opinion that maritime cases were no exception.
The Osceola marked a refusal of the Court to manufacture for
maritime cases an action for negligence it was unwilling to create
at common law. In those pre-Erie288 days, the Court had injured
parties of all kinds to take care of. It took the position that all had
redress in personam under general principles of municipal law, and
refused to create a special action for negligence in favor of seamen,
free from the limitations the Court itself had imposed in other cases.
By the early 1940's, its responsibility for determining general tort
principles had been limited by Erie to cases in admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction. Within this jurisdiction were seamen and long-
shoremen who worked on navigable waters. Since no special cir-
cumstances surrounding the life of a seaman (in the jurisdictional
sense) distinguished him from the longshoremen, there remained
no reason for treating him differently. Seamen no longer fought
off pirates. Some of them dumped garbage and rode home on the
train. They both were subject to the same sort of injuries, falling
down a hatch, slipping on the grease, getting hit on the head when
a winch gave way, getting caught in the gears, slipping on the beans.
Certainly this makes sense. The question asked is why the
Court elected to treat longshoremen like seamen instead of seamen
like longshoremen, for it was the seaman who had become like the
landlubber, not the landlubber who had put to sea. The answer lies
in the fact that seamen were treated differently by Congress. In
the early forties they comprised, together with railroad workers,
the only significant group of American workers without an abso-
lute compensation for injuries. The Court could not fabricate a
workmen's compensation statute, but it found in the traditional
284 149 U.S. 368 (1893). 286 See Agency, 4 HARv. L. REv. 345 (1891).
285 43 Fed. 92 (ED. Mich. 1890). 287 161 Mass. 469 (1894).
288Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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maritime law, in the expansion of maintenance and cure and the
extension of the doctrine of unseaworthiness to cover operating
negligence, the material for approximating a system of absolute lia-
bility. Once the traditional seamen's remedies had been thus en-
larged and expanded, he enjoyed full damages for injuries incurred
under circumstances identical to those that entitled the longshore-
man only to a compensation award of limited amount. Since the
seaman's enlarged remedies had no particular connection with any
special circumstances of his trade, equality of treatment demanded
that a way be found to extend these remedies to longshoremen.
Viewed from within the admiralty jurisdiction the present system
makes good sense. The maintenance and cure of the seaman has
been stretched to come as close as may be to the Harbor Workers'
Compensation award, giving each a guaranteed limited award to
take care of immediate necessities, and the concept of negligence
under the Jones Act and the general maritime law, coupled with
the expanded unseaworthiness doctrine, provide each with full jury
damages in the case of most accidents. It is not pure equality, of
course, for the seaman badly injured by his own bone-headedness,
whose injury is disabling but quick to. reach maximum cure,
has no remedy at all, while the longshoreman has his compensation
award. And the longshoreman injured through the bone-headedness
of a fellow workman has only his compensation award, while the
seaman injured under similar circumstances has his action under
the Jones Act. It is as equal, however, as vulcanizing of history and
precedent can make it.
Viewed from outside the admiralty jurisdiction, the system is
more difficult to justify. In the first place, seamen today are not
only difficult to distinguish from longshoremen in terms of any
special circumstances of hazards and hardship, seamen and long-
shoremen are difficult to distinguish from workers in hundreds of
equally hazardous occupations. As counsel pointed out in Gutier-
rez, it is just as likely that someone will slip on rolling beans in a
warehouse in Louisville as that he will do so on the pier in New
York. So once seamen's remedies are divorced from seaman's pecul-
iar risks, and applied to normal industrial mishaps throughout the
industry, the need for their existence becomes questionable. These
differences are jurisdictional, of course, for the Erie doctrine has
stood as a quarantine line preventing the spread to common law
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of the Court's eleemosynary itch, and the Congress for nearly half
a century has declined to bring seamen and railroad workers within
the normal patterns of statutory compensation, largely because of
the opposition of seamen and railroad workers. Unless it does, and
abrogates by statute the absolute liability of shipowners for full jury
damages, it can be predicted that within the admiralty jurisdiction
the "broad humanitarian policy" will continue to grow, history and
logic will continue to suffer, Mr. Justice Hale will continue to look
on in wonderment,289 and Mr. Justice Harlan, Judge Friendly, and
I will continue to grow liverish.
289 "The sea is a strange and wondrous thing, and equally so is the law it inspires.
Rules derived from it reflect not the fury of this element in its stormy mood but the
gentle nature of a close harbor in the morning calm." Sullivan v. Lyon Steamship
Ltd. 387 P.2d 76, 77 (Wash. 1963).
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